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Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and
Fundamental Rights
ADAM B. WOLF*
American history is longer, larger, more various...
and more terrible than anything anyone has ever said about it.
-James Baldwin'
History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, and if faced
With courage, need not be lived again.
-Maya Angelou 2
I. INTRODUCTION
History has played a famous-and sometimes infamous-role in
American jurisprudence. It has loomed prominently in many areas of
Constitutional interpretation,' though perhaps it has most profoundly
affected fundamental rights jurisprudence, where history and tradition4
are often consulted in order to assess whether a purported right is funda-
mental.' It is surprising, therefore, that legal scholarship has virtually
avoided examining the use of history in fundamental rights analysis.
While some authors have concentrated on the treatment of history in
* Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law. Judicial Law Clerk to The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A., Amherst College. I am
grateful for the comments and suggestions of Erwin Chemerinsky, Marcy Strauss, Mark
Rosenbaum, Meera Deo, Lisa Goldman, and, as always, Elaine and Ira Wolf.
1. James Baldwin, A Talk To Teachers, SATURDAY REV., Dec. 21, 1963, reprinted in
MULTICULTURAL LITERACY 9 (Rick Simonson & Scott Walker eds., 1988).
2. Maya Angelou, On the Pulse of Morning, cited in JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER
TOLD ME: EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN HISTORY TEXTBOOK GOT WRONC 137 (1996).
3. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 612-18 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-75
(1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 452-
58 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern
Anerican Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
4. While some commentators differentiate between history and tradition, see, e.g., A.C.
Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: All Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role
in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 420 (1999), 1 will use the terms
interchangeably.
5. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (plurality opinion); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177,
201 (1993) (commenting that "[t]radition has more recently become almost a litmus test-an all
but insuperable bar to the litigant who fails to invoke it in support of a new [fundamental right]").
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American Constitutional jurisprudence generally6 and others have ana-
lyzed the role played by history in particular fundamental rights cases,7
almost none has focused on the systematic application of history in fun-
damental rights doctrine. 8 In this article, I critically analyze the role of
tradition in fundamental rights jurisprudence. For six reasons I conclude
that a tradition of protecting or denying a purported fundamental right
should not be a factor when assessing the alleged fundamentality of the
right. First, in a nation in which subjugation has been more the norm
than the exception,9 relying on tradition often legitimizes and perpetu-
ates prior discrimination. This is particularly dramatic in fundamental
rights analysis, since purported fundamental rights generally implicate
classifications (e.g., race, class, sexual orientation) that have subjected
6. See generally Brown, supra note 5; Flaherty, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Timothy P. Lydon, Note, If the Parole Board Blunders, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Set the Prisoner Free? Balancing the Liberty Interests of Erroneously Released
Prisoners, 88 GEO. L.J. 565, 576-77 (2000) (describing the role played by tradition in
Glucksberg).
8. The few articles that have discussed employing tradition in fundamental rights
jurisprudence primarily have concluded that it should continue to be used, albeit to a somewhat
lesser extent. See, e.g., Edward P. Steegmann, Note, Of History and Due Process, 63 IND. L.J.
369, 398 (1988) (concluding that the "evils [of employing tradition to find fundamental rights] are
by no means insubstantial-but careful consideration reveals that they are overborne by the
immense goods which can flow from a proper resort to tradition"). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 106 (1991) (stating that "[tlhe tradition-
bound approach is . . . doomed to fail" and that "even [a] limited claim for the tradition-bound
approach seems insupportable"); James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of
Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 148 (1999) (choosing the employment of tradition in
fundamental rights jurisprudence as the single most important development in American legal
history to "extinguish . . . utterly from legal memory").
Recent fundamental rights scholarship has focused on the level of abstraction at which a
court should assess a purported fundamental right without much regard for the role tradition
should play in the analysis, see infra note 139, while the fundamental rights topic that has received
the most scholarly attention is whether courts should recognize unenumerated rights at all, see
David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenunerated Fundamental Rights?:
Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchenmy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 795, 801 (1996). 1
will assume that courts should recognize such rights, for, among other reasons, courts clearly do
the same. See, e.g., Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The Court is correct ... in repeating that the prohibition against deprivations of life, liberty, or
property contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends beyond the
command of fair procedures. It can no longer be controverted that due process has a substantive
component as well."); Fleming, supra, at 152 (commenting that "1 should praise the . . .
conference for accepting that substantive liberties are here to stay ... rather than reopening the
controversy whether substantive liberties as such are anomalous and illegitimate in our
constitutional scheme"). Rather than question whether courts should recognize these rights, I shall
press ahead to the more contemporary question of how they should be recognized.
9. See generally, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE PIG FARMER'S DAUGHTER AND OTHER
TALES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 TO
THE PRESENT (1999); MANNING MARABLE, HOW CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA
(2000); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT (1995).
TRADITION AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
members of such groups to disproportionate prejudice by the empow-
ered classes.
Second, adhering to tradition contravenes the purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to free
Americans from the shackles of government-sponsored oppression, not
to further past subjugation.' ° To resort to tradition in interpreting the
Due Process Clause makes a mockery of the Fourteenth Amendment by
adopting discrimination as the paradigm against which the government's
actions are to be judged.
Third, relying on tradition often renders the fundamental rights doc-
trine irrelevant. As a matter of logic, employing tradition gives credence
only to those views that society has valued, obviating the need to protect
the practices further. If fundamental rights are limited to conduct so
entrenched in the nation's history and traditions, then nobody would
require a judicial determination to engage in such acts. Providing the
force of law to nationally accepted ideas and practices makes the doc-
trine of fundamental rights immaterial.
Fourth, tradition does not facilitate the objectivity that it ostensibly
provides.'' Rather, relying on tradition sanctions jurists' personal
beliefs because the judges, acting as historians, interpret history from the
only perspective they know: their own. Their positionality and political
ideology necessarily affect their analyses of history and tradition. For
instance, the judge as historian should, though she almost never does,
ask, "whose history?" As Professor John Hart Ely wondered: "Whose
traditions? America's only? Why not the entire world's? (Justice
Frankfurter liked to refer to the traditions of the 'English-speaking peo-
ples.') And what is the relevant time frame? All of history? Antecon-
stitutional? ... And who is to say that the 'tradition' must have been one
endorsed by a majority?"' 2 Typically, white, straight, wealthy, male
jurists will rely on a white, straight, wealthy, male history and historical
perspective.
If we are not to fall into the trap of viewing tradition as "the history
of [a nation's] dominant class," as Kwame Nkrumah wrote,' 3 tradition
must account for the plethora of different cultures in a nation as pluralis-
tic as the United States. This brings us to the fifth point, namely that the
10. Professor James Fleming similarly writes that "the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a
scheme of 'aspirational principles' rather than merely being the Burkean deposit of 'historical
practices.'" Fleming, supra note 8, at 156.
11. For arguments that tradition fosters objectivity and predictability, see infra notes 70-71
and accompanying text.
12. John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39
(1978) (footnotes omitted).
13. KWAME NKRUMAH, CONSCIENCiSM 63 (1964).
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malleability of tradition allows for great abuse in fundamental rights
opinions. Jurists may rely on tradition to produce the results that satisfy
their sociopolitical leanings. A monolithic interpretation of tradition can
support or refute most any cause or, as the case may be, purported fun-
damental right. While tradition is supposedly a "neutral principle," its
use in recognizing fundamental rights breeds the intellectual dishonesty
and value-laden decisions that, theoretically, it is supposed to stem.
Result-oriented opinions have always dotted the landscape of fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence, 4 and the invocation of tradition as a method for
finding fundamental rights has only further infused subjectivity into the
doctrine.
Sixth, and finally, using tradition as an analytical tool in fundamen-
tal rights opinions perpetuates discrimination in ways that defy an edu-
cational purpose of history. That is, blind obedience to history subverts
an important objective of history: to learn from it in order to follow (and
improve upon) what is worthy of replication and to avoid returning to
that which should not be repeated. Not distinguishing between odious
and laudatory traditions allows the reinvigoration of oppression that our
nation knows intimately.
A survey of fundamental rights cases-mostly Supreme Court
opinions, though also lower federal court decisions--- will bring to light
the aforementioned problems with employing tradition as a methodolog-
ical tool to assess the fundamentality of purported rights. In Part II, in
order to provide context to a tradition-bound fundamental rights frame-
work, I discuss various theories for finding unenumerated rights and
document different methodologies for recognizing purported fundamen-
tal rights, including reliance on tradition. In Part III, I show how
employing a tradition-based methodology to assess fundamental rights
could have eviscerated prior findings of such rights. Part III also dem-
onstrates how invoking tradition can legitimize and perpetuate prior
discrimination.
Parts IV and V explore how tradition has been used to further the
result-oriented mindset of jurists in cases that assess purported funda-
mental rights. Part IV inquires into the malleability of tradition.
Whether due to jurists' result-oriented analyses, notoriously erroneous
views of history, or the United States' multicultural traditions, history
often yields conflicting results in fundamental rights cases. Part V looks
at the uneven application of tradition by individual Justices-that is,
how particular Justices employed tradition when they determined it sat-
isfied their sociopolitical viewpoint, but shunned tradition when they
believed it did not suit their interests.
14. See infra Parts IV-V.
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What the cases reveal is that employing tradition as a methodology
to assess fundamental rights most often gives agency to racism, clas-
sism, and homophobia, among other forms of discrimination; breeds
intellectual dishonesty; permits as many subjective, value-laden funda-
mental rights opinions as most other analytical tools; and, in the end,
effectively reads out substance from the fundamental rights doctrine. To
live up to the potential of the Fourteenth Amendment, to heed the warn-
ings of history, to reject the United States' history of discrimination,
and, ultimately, to restore legitimacy and relevance to fundamental
rights jurisprudence, we must forego a tradition-based analysis in favor
of a more honest, manageable, and just fundamental rights methodology.
Offering a substitute framework for recognizing "new" fundamen-
tal rights is outside the scope of this article. Many scholars have balked
when asked to reconfigure affirmatively the jurisprudence,' 5 and opposi-
tion to the current doctrine must be lodged before we turn to reshaping
it. This article attempts to plant the seed of such resistance, and leaves
to another day the task of formulating a jurisprudence that is more con-
gruous, applicable, and equitable than the current tradition-bound
approach.
II. "FINDING" FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Before explaining why deference to tradition is inappropriate when
assessing a purported fundamental right, I will briefly sketch the history
of fundamental rights jurisprudence. Doing so will provide context to
the applicability of tradition to fundamental rights analysis, making it
even clearer that tradition has no place in the doctrine.
A. Recognizing Unenumerated Rights
"Simple clauses," state Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael
Dorf, "don't necessarily make easy cases."' 6 The Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment'" have generated as
15. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1136 (1997) ("[WIhat
[should be] the source of fundamental rights for purposes of substantive due process? This is one
of the largest unanswered questions in American jurisprudence, and it would be foolish to attempt
a full answer here."); Ely, supra note 12, at 55 (noting that Alexander Bickel concluded that
"nothing else works" except "'imposing one's own values" when attempting to devise an
appropriate fundamental rights methodology).
16. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 8, at 33.
17. The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses provide: "[N~or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While most of the
cases discussed in this article involve interpretations of the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), a few are fundamental
2002]
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much controversy and uncertainty as any constitutional provision. 8 As
one commentator noted, "[e]veryone knows that no one knows what
'substantive due process' really is."' 9 What is generally accepted, how-
ever, is that there is such a thing as "fundamental rights,"20 the denial of
which must satisfy strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional
muster.2
Deciding which asserted "rights" are "fundamental" is no easy task,
and it is the methodological framework for "finding" fundamental rights
that is the subject of this article. To start, the disparate theories regard-
ing the source of unenumerated rights specifically, and of constitutional
interpretation generally, make it nearly impossible to arrive at one unify-
ing principle for assessing the fundamentality of rights. For example,
some argue that originalism should guide the approach to finding such
rights. According to them, jurists asked to proclaim a "new" fundamen-
tal right must look no further than the intent of the ratifiers of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 22
Nonoriginalist approaches run the gamut. While "natural law"-
that is, a "higher law" that cannot be codified2 3-is "an obvious candi-
rights cases that were brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
18. See Jason S. Marks, Beyond Penumbras and Emanations: Fundamental Rights, the Spirit
of the Revolution, anid the Ninth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 435, 437-38 (1995)
(commenting that the "right of privacy ... has become perhaps the most prominent topic of
contemporary jurisprudence").
19. Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkanmpf or, How America Overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DUKE L.J. 1559, 1582 (2000).
20. Not everyone accepts the phrase "fundamental rights." See Crump, supra note 8, at 801
("Not all of the Justices appear to accept the terminology of fundamental rights .... Sometimes
the cases refer to interests as 'significant' or use similar designations."). Nonetheless, I will
employ the term due to its general acceptance.
21. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). The only fundamental right not
subject to strict scrutiny is the right to abortion. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the "undue burden" test to restrictions on a
woman's fundamental right to an abortion).
22. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTI-ENrI AMENDMENT 363-64, 407-08, 417-18 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TE-MPTING OF
AMERICA 264-65 (1989) (commenting that "[w]hen a court strikes down a statute, it always denies
the freedom of the people who voted for the representatives who enacted the law.... That is what
is always involved when constitutional adjudication proceeds by a concern for results rather than
by concern for reasoning friom original understanding"); Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional
Theory, 26 S. Ti x. L. Ri-v. 383 (1985); Edwin Meese Ill, The Supreme Court of the United
States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 455 (1985); Antonin Scalia,
Originalisni: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). See generally Crump, supra note 8,
at 819-24. Even within originalism-a fairly inflexible methodology-there are different
factions. See GEOFFREY R. SrON: ET AL., CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW 786-87 (3d ed. 1996) (describing
the difference between "hard originalists" and "soft originalists"); Crump, supra note 8, at 824
(distinguishing between "sophisticated originalists" and "strict originalists").
23. Thomas C. Gray, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716
(1975) ("Thus in the framing of the original American constitution it was widely accepted that
[Vol. 57: 101
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date in the search for a source of values to give content to the Constitu-
tion's open-ended provisions, 24 it is a theory that is ridiculed in all but
the most conservative circles. Others advance a "moral" reading of the
Constitution, pursuant to which the Constitution is a living document
that must change as society evolves. Professor Alexander Bickel wrote:
[Government] should serve not only what we conceive from time to
time to be our immediate material needs but also certain enduring
values .... [Such values] must be continually derived, enunciated,
and seen in relevant application. [Judges] have certain capacities for
dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do
not possess .... Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training,
and the insulation to . . . pursu[e] the ends of government. This is
crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society.2 6
Many other forms of nonoriginalism, such as the representation-
reinforcement theory27 and the constitution-perfecting theory, 28 have
been proposed to ground constitutional interpretations. Some attempt to
blend originalism and nonoriginalism. 29 A few, such as Professor Ely's
representation-reinforcement theory, have received significant critical
there remained unwritten but still binding principles of higher law."). For an argument that the
framers of the Constitution intended for the judiciary to protect people's natural rights, see
generally HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND JUSTICE (1986); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CI. L. REv.
1127 (1987).
24. Ely, supra note 12, at 23.
25. See id. at 29 (commenting that "[i]t . . . has become increasingly evident that the only
propositions with a prayer of passing themselves off as 'natural law' are those so uselessly vague
that no one will notice"). Ironically, one reason for the downfall of the natural law movement was
that it provided no certainty to the interpretation of Constitutional provisions. "Natural law has
had as its content whatever the individual in question desired to advocate." Id. at 28 (internal
quotations omitted) (noting that natural law was "invoked on both sides of the slavery question").
26. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-26 (1962).
27. John Hart Ely is the most notable adherent of the representation-reinforcement theory,
which seeks to interpret the Constitution in ways that best promote democracy. See. e.g., JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7-8, 87-88 (1980):
[Rule] in accord with the consent of a majority is the core of the American
governmental system. . . . The tricky task [is to promote] a way [of] protecting
minorities from majority tyranny that is not a flagrant contradiction of the principle
of majority rule. . . . [T]he [Constitution is] overwhelmingly concerned . . . with
ensuring broad participation in the processes [of] government.
28. Professor James Fleming has proposed synthesizing various representation-reinforcement
theories to achieve a "constitutional constructivism, a Constitution-perfecting theory," which
Fleming describes as a "theory of constitutional democracy and trustworthiness, an alternative to
Ely's theory of representative democracy and distrust and to [Cass] Sunstein's theory of
deliberative democracy and impartiality." James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 219 (1993).
29. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Ti~x. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (1993), for a
theory of constitutional interpretation that attempts to blend the ratifiers' intent with the challenges
and realities of contemporary society.
2002]
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attention, while others are less well known.3"
Naturally, one's theoretical model for constitutional interpretation
informs one's methodology for finding fundamental rights. An original-
ist, for example, is unlikely to rely on her personal notions of liberty or
justice when assessing whether a purported right is fundamental. Not
surprisingly, then, the methodologies used to find fundamental rights are
as varied and distinct as the models of constitutional interpretation upon
which they are based.
B. Tradition and Other Sources of Fundamental Rights
While tradition is the current, generally accepted methodology for
assessing purported fundamental rights, jurists have employed many
other analytical frameworks to evaluate the fundamentality of asserted
rights. Reviewing a broad spectrum of fundamental rights cases will
reveal the myriad methodologies for finding such rights and will chroni-
cle-and perhaps explain-tradition's rise to prominence in fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence.
The earliest fundamental rights opinions date back to an era to
which few wish to return: economic substantive due process. 3' The
"Lochner era' 32 was the Court's first recognition that the Due Process
Clause should embrace more than certain procedural safeguards. The
Supreme Court, between 1890 and 1937, routinely held that state legisla-
tion designed to protect workers against growing capitalistic interests
was unconstitutional because it interfered with the liberty of contract
protected by the Due Process Clause.33 Its justification for recognizing a
fundamental right to contract, however, is not so clear. The Justices
30. See. e.g., Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 4. Professor Pritchard's and Zywicki's
"finding model" looks to the common law and state constitutional law to assess purported
unenumerated rights. See id. at 409.
31. One commentator described economic substantive due process as a "dark and prickly
thicket." Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 251,
254 (2001). See also, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1002, 1069 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (voicing concern that the Lucas Court's holding "would represent a return to the era
of Lochner") (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 467 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Eisenstadt majority for "hark[ening] back to the heyday of substantive due process").
32. The Lochner era derives its name from the most famous economic substantive due
process case, Loc/ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33. Mugler v. Konsas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), was the first Supreme Court opinion to recognize
the substantive component of due process, even though the Court upheld the law in question in
Mugler. In 1890, the Court explicitly adopted fundamental rights in Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). See generallv WIttLAM M. WIECEK, LIBERrY
UNDER LAw: THE SUPREME COURT IN AME~RICAN Lt1E 118 (1988) (reviewing these early
economic substantive due process opinions). Faced with the threat of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's court-packing plan, economic substantive due process suffered an ignominous death
in 1937. See STONE ET AL., supra note 22, at 215 (explaining that "the real point of [Roosevelt's]
[Vol. 57: 101
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provided little to no explanation for their reasons for finding this funda-
mental right, leading some to speculate that the Justices resorted to lofty
yet unsupportable notions of liberty, and others to contend that the Jus-
tices were motivated by "a sincere commitment to the protection of
human liberty."34
Due in part to an emerging criticism of Lochner and its progeny,
jurists sought not to turn their backs on fundamental rights altogether,
but rather to leave the arena of economic due process and find other
fundamental rights with more certain methodologies than did the Loch-
ner Court. Meyer v. Nebraska3" and Pierce v. Society of Sisters36 were
the Court's next two major fundamental rights opinions. Holding that
parents have a fundamental right to direct the education of their children,
the Meyer Court relied on American tradition. Pierce, somewhat less
analytically interesting than Meyer, merely relied on Meyer to hold that
an Oregon law requiring that parents of children between eight and six-
teen years send their children to public school violated parents' funda-
mental right to "direct the upbringing ... of children."38 Thus, by 1925,
the Court had identified three methodologies to find fundamental rights:
abstract notions of liberty, tradition, and precedent.39
Two decades later, Justice Frankfurter expanded on Meyer's invo-
cation of tradition. Ruminating on the problems with interpreting the
seemingly open-ended Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, which
he termed "phrases of large generalities," Frankfurter stated:
But they are not generalities of unillumined vagueness; they are gen-
court-packing plan was to increase the number of justices who would find New Deal legislation
constitutional" or to force the Justices to capitulate to the legislation).
34. Shepherd, supra note 31, at 255-56; see also WIECEK, supra note 33, at 114-15 (stating
that many judges during the Lochner era considered "protect[ing] human liberty as [their] highest
goal"). See generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & Hisv. REV. 293 (1985)
(explaining that Lochner-era judges adhered to a political ideology that eschewed government
interference at the expense of human liberty).
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
37. The Court focused on its contention that "[t]he American people have always regarded
education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be
diligently promoted," and that "establish[ing] a home and bring[ing] up children ... [was a]
privilege long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400. Later in this article I will discuss how Meyer jibes with a host
of fundamental rights cases that misinterpret-deliberately or not-American history. See infra
Part IV.B.l.
38. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (concluding that "[tlhe fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only").
39. 1 distinguish throughout this article between tradition and judicial precedent when the
holding of the precedent relied upon is not grounded in tradition or history.
2002]
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eralities circumscribed by history and appropriate to the largeness of
the problems of government with which they were concerned ...
The safeguards of "due process of law" and "the equal protection of
the laws" summarize the history of freedom of English-speaking peo-
ples running back to [the] Magna Carta and reflected in the constitu-
tional development of our people.
40
Similarly, in 1934 Cardozo opined that a purported right is funda-
mental when infringement upon the alleged right would "offend some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple."'4 ' At the same time, Cardozo proposed another fundamental rights
methodology, one that would be relied upon long after he retired from
the bench: whether the purported right is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."42
As the Court headed toward the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, its fundamental rights docket expanded, as did the Justices' meth-
odologies for finding such rights. In 1952, for example, Justice
Frankfurter attempted to blend some of the methodologies discussed
above. He proposed that judges assessing a purported fundamental right
should ask whether proscribing the conduct would "offend those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples," and whether the conduct was "so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental ... or
implicit in the concept or ordered liberty. '43 Attempting to preempt crit-
icism of a methodology that grants jurists nearly unbridled discretion,
Frankfurter wrote:
In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human
rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning,
is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional
provisions....
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave
judges at large .... Even though the concept of due process of law is
40. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (holding that a criminal defendant does
not possess a fundamental right to be present when the prosecutor takes a field trip with the jury to
the scene of the crime because the defendant traditionally has not been present at such a viewing).
42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that a criminal defendant does
not have a fundamental right to be free from the government's appealing a ruling in a criminal
case), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Justice Souter, for
example, recently invoked the "concept of ordered liberty" test in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 765 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
43. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) ("[T]he Court's function in the
observance of this settled conception of the Due Process Clause does not leave us without
adequate guides in subjecting [statutes] to constitutional judgment.") (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at
105).
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not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that
are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process.4 4
Such opinions welcoming fundamental rights paved the way for a
fundamental rights revolution-an expansion of fundamental rights that
eventually resulted in the fundamental rights backlash in which we cur-
rently are mired. Poe v. Ullman,45 in which the Court's plurality opinion
actually did not reach the fundamental rights issue,46 kicked off the judi-
ciary's 1960s fundamental rights explosion. Concluding that a Connect-
icut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated married
couples' right to privacy, Justice Douglas's dissent in Poe found a right
for married individuals to use contraceptives because it was "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."47
Justice Harlan similarly dissented, also concluding that the statute
ran afoul of plaintiffs' fundamental right to use contraception. He
employed a vastly different methodological framework, however, to
assess the fundamentality of the purported right. Concerned that the
Due Process Clause "is not self-explanatory" and that "the history of the
Amendment also sheds little light on the meaning of the provision,"
Harlan inquired into "the balance which our Nation, built upon postu-
lates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society."4 In other words, Harlan
returned to tradition as a source of fundamental rights. If the United
States has traditionally protected a freedom to use contraceptives, it
should be deemed "fundamental"; if it has not been historically recog-
nized, then it should not receive the legal protection of a fundamental
right.49
Only four years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,50 the Court
reversed course and found that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of
contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded on the right of marital pri-
vacy. Holding that the law violated married couples' fundamental right
44. 1(d. at 169-70.
45. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
46. A plurality of the Court held that the Poe plaintiffs' claims were not ripe for adjudication
because Connecticut tacitly agreed not to prosecute individuals for violations of the state law. See
id. at 507-08.
47. Id. at 518 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE
CONSTITuTtON 80 (1951)).
48. Id. at 542 (adding that "[t]he balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well
as the traditions froni which it broke. That tradition is a living thing").
49. Perhaps not recognizing the significant differences between Harlan's and Douglas's
dissents, and not mindful of the import that such differences would have on fundamental rights
jurisprudence in the future, Justice Stewart dissented separately, stating that he agreed with both
Harlan and Douglas. See id. at 555.
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497 (1965).
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to use contraception, the Justices employed a variety of methodological
frameworks, including precedent,5' abstract understandings of and
respect for marriage,52 tradition, 53 and the concept of ordered liberty.54
Fundamental rights figured prominently on the Supreme Court's
docket during the next twenty years. From Loving v. Virginia55 to Stan-
ley v. Georgia,56 Roe v. Wade,57 San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez,58 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,59 and Zablocki v.
Redhailj0 fundamental rights was the buzzword at the Court. Neverthe-
less, the Justices' fundamental rights opinions during this period were
marked more by quantity than consistency. Resorting to all of their pre-
vious fundamental rights methodologies, the opinions were, at best, a
pastiche of constitutional interpretation. While fundamental rights was
gaining near-unanimous acceptance, the judiciary lacked a coherent and
uniform approach to finding them. Perhaps most disturbing was that the
Justices almost never seemed to recognize their analytical differences
and the implications of such differences on the jurisprudence. 6'
The Justices' reluctance to acknowledge explicitly their disparate
fundamental rights methodologies lasted until 1986. Bowers v. Hard-
wick62 and Michael H. v. Gerald D.63 brought the issue to the forefront.
In each case, the Court's opinion held that the purported right in ques-
tion was not a fundamental right, and the dissents found a fundamental
right. Not surprisingly, the majority opinions grounded their fundamen-
tal rights analyses in tradition, while the dissents refused to do so.
64
51. See id. at 484 (plurality opinion), 486-87, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
52. See id. at 486 (plurality opinion).
53. See id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
58. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
60. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. See, for example, Poe v. Ul/man, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting),
discussed supra note 46.
62. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
63. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
64. Compare id. at 123 (plurality opinion) ("insist[ing] that the asserted liberty interest be
rooted in history and tradition"), with id. at 136-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disavowing the use
of tradition to recognize purported fundamental rights); id. at 157-58, 161 (White, J., dissenting)
(relying on precedent exclusively and stating that there is "no reason to debate the plurality's...
ancient policy concerns"). Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (emphasizing that
"[pIroscriptions against [the alleged fundamental right] have ancient roots"), id. at 196-97
(Burger, J., concurring) (adhering to "millennia of moral teaching"), id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a
fundamental right."), with id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree that either the
length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them [is
[Vol. 57: 101
TRADITION AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Importantly, and unlike the Court's prior fundamental rights opinions,
the dissenting Justices expressly rejected tradition as an analytical tool to
assess purported fundamental rights. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in
Bowers, commented:
Essentially ... the Court agree[s] that the fact that the acts [of sod-
omy] for hundreds of years, if not thousands, have been uniformly
condemned as immoral is a sufficient reason to permit a State to ban
them today.
I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held
its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can with-
draw legislation from this Court's scrutiny ...
The assertion that traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe
the conduct involved cannot provide an adequate justification for
[criminalizing sodomy]. . . . [M]ere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty.65
Justice Stevens's Bowers dissent 66 and Justice Brennan's dissent in
Michael H.67 similarly eschewed the Court's reliance on tradition.
With its acceptance by the Court in Bowers and Michael H., as well
as in its most recent fundamental rights cases,6 8 tradition has become the
primary-if not the exclusive-fundamental rights methodology. 69
Some view this sub-revolution in fundamental rights jurisprudence as a
way for jurists' personal predilections to be displaced by a "neutral prin-
ciple."7 These proponents of tradition view it as "disinterested" and
relevant to fundamental rights analysis]."), id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that
"the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for [not recognizing a fundamental right]").
65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
66. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that in invoking
tradition in its fundamental rights analysis, "the plurality has not found the objective boundary that
it seeks").
67. See id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (plurality opinion).
69. In the aftermath of Bowers and Michael H., Professor Rebecca Brown noted: "[Tiradition
has more recently become almost a litmus test-an all but insuperable bar to the litigant who fails
to invoke it in support of a new [fundamental right]." Brown, supra note 5, at 201.
70. For example, Professor Michael McConnell writes about using tradition in fundamental
rights analysis: "In principle, judges of diametrically opposed opinions on the wisdom orjustice of
the challenged law should reach the same legal conclusion, since the decision will hinge on
objective historical fact rather than on normative judgment." Michael W. McConnell, The Right
to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 672. See also, e.g., James
Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster and the Future of Substantive Due Process, 28 DUQ. L.
REv. 271, 282 (1990) ("To prevent [result-oriented approaches to purported fundamental rights],
the new working majority on the Court has endeavored to establish neutral principles to govern its
decisions.").
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"objective.' Others defend tradition as an avenue for jurists to express
the will of the majority. 2
Nonetheless, employing tradition to assess purported fundamental
rights has significant drawbacks. The remainder of this article is
devoted to exploring the problems with using tradition in fundamental
rights jurisprudence.
III. TRADITION: FUNDAMENTALLY EVISCERATING
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Tradition strips substance from fundamental rights jurisprudence.
Among other problems with using tradition as a source for purported
fundamental rights (explored in subsequent sections of this article),
"judicial insistence that the asserted liberty interest be rooted in history
and tradition . . . is a way to reduce dramatically or eliminate altogether
the opportunity for litigants to establish a successful claim to constitu-
tional protection."73 While this point should be obvious, it has been
relatively unexplored in judicial case law or scholarly projects.
There are two basic reasons why employing tradition to assess fun-
damental rights renders the doctrine a nullity. The first was identified
by Justice Brennan in Michael H.:
IB]y describing the decisive question as whether [plaintiffs'] interest
is one that has been traditionally protected by our society ... and by
suggesting that our sole function is to discern the society's views, the
plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
confirm the importance of interests already protected by a majority of
the States. Transforming the protection afforded by the Due Process
Clause into a redundancy mocks those who, with care and purpose,
wrote the Fourteenth Amendment.74
71. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 8, at 860.
72. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 70, at 667, 672 (commenting that "courts have no
authority to displace the decisions of the representatives of the people" and that "[tihe effect [of
relying on tradition] is to allow the democratic, decentralized institutions of the country to
continue to ponder the issue"); Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to
hnpose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 853, 869 (1991)
("Perhaps the strongest argument for the Supreme Court's use of tradition is its inherently
democratic character.").
73. Brown, supra note 5, at 202 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989))
(internal quotations omitted); see also TRIBE & DORF, supra note 8, at 104; Fleming, supra note 8,
at 160 ("Through his [tradition-based] methodology, Rehnquist, like Scalia, is engaging in damage
control; his concerns are not merely to decline to extend [fundamental rights] cases, but also to gut
the cases of any vitality or generative force."); Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1991) ("Scalia's position, if accepted,
would undermine not only Michael H. but also virtually every major substantive due process case
of the last twenty years.").
74. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations, emphasis, and
quotation omitted).
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There is no need for a court to recognize fundamental rights, of course,
if they are restricted to rights that society always has protected.75
Rather, it is precisely because the practice in question has not been tradi-
tionally recognized that it would need the protection accorded funda-
mental rights.76
Second, in a nation whose history is riddled with oppression," rely-
ing on tradition often only reinforces such injustice. In other words,
resorting to tradition in assessing fundamental rights usually works to
ratify prior discrimination. It perpetuates racism, classism, and misog-
yny, among other forms of discrimination, a result that nullifies the
countermajoritarian purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The following examination of fundamental rights cases reveals the
discriminatory effect of using tradition to assess fundamental rights. It
further demonstrates how using tradition as an analytical tool to assess
fundamental rights strips fundamental rights of meaning and violates the
spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment. These opinions, in which the
Supreme Court or lower courts found fundamental rights without resort-
ing to tradition, likely would have reached opposite conclusions had the
courts used tradition to assess the fundamental rights at issue.78
A. Right to Marriage
Loving and Zablocki establish a fundamental right to marry. 9 Yet,
in finding such a right, neither opinion assessed whether marriage is
deeply rooted in tradition and history. There is a good reason that the
Court did not conduct such an examination; subjecting the right to marry
to the "tradition test" would possibly have compelled a finding that there
is no such fundamental right. Zablocki struck down a Wisconsin law
75. Professor Brown expressed the same idea in more forgiving terms: "reliance on tradition
as a basis for the definition of constitutional protection is a societal statement of complacency."
Brown, supra note 5, at 204.
76. See, e.g., Lynn Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in
1998, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 253, 268 (1998) (arguing for a fundamental right for same-sex marriage
and claiming that precisely "[blecause same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in history and
tradition .... a new fundamental right must be recognized").
77. See supra note 9.
78. The fact that prior fundamental rights cases probably would have been decided differently
had the courts relied on tradition to assess the fundamentality of the right in question is not a novel
observation. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the Court would not have found a fundamental right in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), had the Court assessed the fundamentality
of the right in question in light of tradition); id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Loving
and commenting that "neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation
from constitutional attack").
79. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. While the
Supreme Court has found a fundamental right to marry, it is worth noting that the right is, in fact,
not extended to all people (e.g., lesbians and gay men). See, e.g., infra note 83.
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that prohibited certain individuals from obtaining a marriage license
because it violated their fundamental right to marry.80 While the Court
wrote that "the right to marry is of fundamental importance" and that
"[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' ",' it did not explore
how tradition supports the fundamentality of marriage.
United States history is replete with examples of the systematic
denial of the right to marry. Most obviously, Black Americans have
been refused the right to marry for far longer than they have known the
freedom to marry; Black slaves in the United States were prohibited
from marrying.82 Moreover, lesbians and gay men traditionally have
never been allowed to marry, and, in almost every state, they continue to
be unable to enter into marriage.83 Furthermore, throughout this
nation's history, some states have prohibited marriage to certain individ-
uals, such as "genetic undesirables,"84 based on other immutable
characteristics.
80. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-91.
81. Id. at 383 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942))).
82. See Laura F. Edwards, "The Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation of All Our Rights":
The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina After Emancipation, 14 L. & HIST. REv. 81, 90
(1996) (explaining that in North Carolina, "[t]he law had not recognized slave marriages, and
emancipation did not make them legal"); Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural
Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 660 n.82 (2001) (noting that "there
[was]I no legally-sanctioned marriage between slaves," notwithstanding the misnomer "slave
marriage," which merely represented "cohabitation" between male and female slaves); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV.
1283, 1330 n.333 (2000) (pointing out that "slave marriage" was not legally recognized).
83. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (concluding that "we do not
believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of
our people"); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 331 (D.C. 1995) (holding that "same-
sex marriage is not a 'fundamental right' . .. because that kind of relationship is not 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'") (citation omitted); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588, 589 (Ky. 1973) ("[M]arriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman
.... .); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971) (finding that while "[t]he
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman ... is as old as the book of Genesis," there is
no support in the traditions of the United States to support a fundamental right to marriage
between people of the same gender). In addition to judicial precedent and statutes, dictionary
definitions of "marriage" similarly exclude the possibility of a same-sex marriage. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 972 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "marriage" as the "Ilegal union of one man and
one woman as husband and wife"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384
(Phillip Babcock Grove et al. eds., 1993) (defining "marriage" as "the state of being united to a
person of the opposite sex as husband or wife"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (2d ed. 1910)
(defining "marriage" as "the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life");
WEBSTER'S MODERN DICTIONARY 281 (1902) (defining "marriage" as "unit[ing] in wedlock or
matrimony; join[ing], as a man and woman, for life; mak[ing] man and wife"). But see An Act
Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (granting same-sex couples many, but not
all, of the rights of marriage).
84. Adam B. Wolf, What Money Cannot Buy: A Legislative Response to CRACK, 33 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 173, 188 (1999-2000) (quoting George P. Smith II, Genetics, Eugenics, and
Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL. U. L. 435, 439-44).
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Loving is. even more dubious in light of tradition. The Loving
Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute prohibiting miscegenation
because under the Due Process Clause, "the freedom to marry or not
marry a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State."85 While Loving acknowledged some degree of
tradition contrary to its holding,86 the Court did not recognize the vast
traditional support for anti-miscegenation laws. Dozens of states have
had, at one time or another, miscegenation statutes, 7 and, as the Loving
Court acknowledged, thirty states had outlawed miscegenation as
recently as fifteen years before Loving was issued.88
Interestingly, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Bow-
ers, "miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to sodomy." 89
While the Bowers Court used this prior discrimination to subjugate les-
bians and gay men further, holding that there is no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy,9" neither the Loving Court nor the
Zablocki Court was motivated by such prior discrimination. Thus, the
latter cases established the fundamental right to marry.
B. Right to Procreate
In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,9' the Court held that the right to
procreate is a fundamental right. The Skinner Court concluded that
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Act, which authorized mandatory surgi-
cal sterilization for individuals convicted of two or more crimes involv-
ing "moral turpitude," was unconstitutional because it infringed on the
right to procreate.92 The Court provided almost no authority, however,
let alone evidence of tradition, to support its holding that the right to
85. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
86. See id. at 6 ("Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the
basis of racial classifications. Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and have
been common in Virginia since the colonial period.").
87. See Michaelson, supra note 19, at 1569.
88. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5. For a history of the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute,
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1967), see generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff,
Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEo. L.J.
1967 (1989); Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1966). Others also have commented that tradition
does not support one's fundamental right to marry an individual of a different race. See, e.g.,
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 805 n.20 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Had the Court
applied a rigid, originalist view of constitutional interpretation, a married couple consisting of a
black husband and a white wife (or vice-versa) would be unable to live in the state of Virginia
today.").
89. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 n.9 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing JOHN
G. HAWLEY & MALCOLM MCGREGOR, THE CRIMINAL LAW 287, 288 (3d ed. 1899)).
90. See id. at 192.
91. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
92. See id. at 536-37, 541.
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procreate is fundamental.93
An inquiry into the history of procreation likely would have yielded
a very different result. The eugenics movement, which had been grow-
ing since the late nineteenth century, was thriving in the United States in
1942.94 By 1935, approximately 20,000 forced eugenical sterilizations
had been performed in the United States.9 5 Many of these were carried
out pursuant to thirty-two state statutes mandating eugenical steriliza-
tions.96 In 1927, the Supreme Court explicitly held that these statutes
were constitutional.97 Upholding involuntary sterilizations, the Court
stated that "[i]t is better for all the world, if... society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough." 98
Moreover, the United States has an infamous history of denying
procreative autonomy to Black Americans. Slavemasters owned the
reproductive abilities of their slaves and arranged for their slaves to have
intercourse, also known as "slave breeding," in order to perpetuate the
institution of slavery and to further dehumanize their slaves. 99 Sexual
coercion and forced procreation have been bedrocks of the Black Ameri-
can experience.' Such denials of reproductive autonomy were author-
ized explicitly by state statutes and validated by judicial decrees.''
93. See id. at 541.
94. See Wolf, supra note 84, at 188. See generally HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS
OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION (1929).
95. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 332 (1985).
Involuntary eugenical sterilizations were performed well after 1935, as well. For example, Fannie
Lou Hamer, one of America's most passionate, effective, and visible political organizers, checked
into a hospital in 1961 to have a uterine tumor removed. Only after leaving the hospital was she
informed that she was given a hysterectomy, notwithstanding a lack of prior notification or
consent. See KAY MILLS, THIs LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER 21-22
(1994).
96. See Wolf, supra note 84, at 188.
97. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
98. Id. Incidentally, though Carrie Buck was sterilized pursuant to a state statute that required
the sterilization of the mentally retarded, she was later discovered to possess normal intelligence.
See Gould, supra note 95, at 336.
99. See generally Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth
Anendinent Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 11, 11-23 (2001)
[hereinafter Bridgewater, Slave Breeding]; see also Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive
Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the Struggle for Reproductive
Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401, 413-15 (2000). Cf ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE,
AND CLASS 3-4 (1983) (recognizing the disappointing and profound ignorance of historians about
the experiences of female slaves).
100. See Bridgewater, Slave Breeding, supra note 99, at 12 ("[S]lIave breeding was an integral
aspect of what it meant to be a slave during this era."). This is not to say, however, that slaves
were complacent about their sexual exploitation. On the contrary, slaves-particularly female
slaves-developed complex forms of resistance to their owners' sexual oppression. See id. at 26-
29.
101. See id. at 24-26.
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The same could be said of the Native American experience. As
part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' strategy to "destroy all things
Indian," the United States government has forced Native Americans to
undergo sterilization procedures. °2 The eugenical sterilization of
Native Americans has not abated, either. As recently as 1975, approxi-
mately 25,000 Native American women were permanently sterilized,
"many after being coerced, misinformed, or threatened."' °3
Thus, notwithstanding the facts that the country was experiencing a
burgeoning eugenics movements, that a majority of the states required
eugenical sterilizations by statute, that such statutes had the explicit
imprimatur of the Supreme Court, and that Black Americans and Native
Americans, among others, had been systematically denied the freedom
to exercise procreative autonomy, the Skinner Court found a fundamen-
tal right to procreate. Had it relied on tradition, it is likely that no such
fundamental right would have been found.
C. Right to Use Contraception
Neither of the seminal contraception opinions, Eisenstadt v.
Baird"° and Griswold v. Connecticut,"5 employed tradition to assess
the fundamental nature of the right to use contraception. Griswold relied
on precedent and a lofty understanding of marriage to establish the
fundamentality of the right of married couples to use contraception. 1 6
Though the Griswold Court commented that "the right of privacy" is
"older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older
than our school system,"117 it did not seek to establish that the right to
use contraception similarly was grounded in tradition. Eisenstadt
expanded on Griswold, finding a fundamental right for anyone-mar-
ried or not-to use and distribute contraceptives.0" Like Griswold,
Eisenstadt relied on precedent, not tradition, to find the fundamental
right. 10 9
102. Lindsay Glauner, The Need For Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 The United
States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of
Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 911 (2002); see also Nancy
Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 515 (1993) (commenting that
"Native American women[ ] were subjected to forced sterilization in appalling numbers up
through the 1970s, a practice that continues in 'milder' forms today").
103. Coerced Sterilization of Native American Women, Native American Political Issues, at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/9118/mike.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
104. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. See id. at 485-86.
107. Id.
108. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
109. See id.
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History probably does not support such a right. Historically, miso-
gynistic attitudes have proscribed the availability of contraceptives.'
Such attitudes often were codified by statute, including the very laws
held unconstitutional in Eisenstadt and Griswold, which were on the
books for more than eighty and ninety years, respectively. '' The Cath-
olic Church, a significant force in dictating our nation's public policy,
historically has played a substantial role in prohibiting access to
contraceptives. ' I
Instead of relying on our nation's misogynistic past, the Court used
other methodological tools to find a fundamental right to use contracep-
tion. Had the Court felt beholden to accept such past discrimination,
there might be no such fundamental right.
D. Right to Interstate Travel
The Court declared a fundamental right to travel in United States v.
Guest.' '" While the Guest Court found that the "constitutional right to
travel from one State to another.., occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union," the Court relied almost exclusively
on precedent.
110. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 356 (1992) ("Laws
criminalizing contraception . . . were explicitly premised on the view that women are 'child-
rearers,' and that 'the female is destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and ...
the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.'") (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 n.I1 (1982) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975))).
111. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr:
On Definitional Preclusion. Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORD. L. REV. 921,
972 (1995) (commenting that "contraception has a history of being criminalized by the states" and
noting that "at the time that Griswold ... was decided, Connecticut had criminalized the use of
contraception for over eighty years" and that "[w]hen Eisenstadt ... was decided, Massachusetts
had criminalized the distribution of contraceptives for over ninety years"); see also id. at 971-72
(1995) (stating that if the Eisenstadt and Griswold Courts would have relied on tradition to assess
the fundamental right to use contraceptives, then the use of contraceptives would "be
proscribable"). Accord Mark Strasser, Toleration, Approval, and the Right to Marry: On
Constitutional Limitations and Preferential Treatment, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 65, 92 & n. 148
(2001) (noting that tradition does not support a right to use contraception); Mark Strasser, Sex,
Law, and the Sacred Precincts of the Marital Bedroom: Onl State and Federal Right to Privacy
Jurisprudence, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 753, 755 (2000),
112. See, e.g., High Court to Review Law on Contraceptives, S.F. CHRON. Sept. 27, 2001, at
A 14 (stating that Catholic Charities of Sacramento, California, filed a lawsuit claiming that a state
law requiring companies that offer prescription drug coverage to their workers to include female
contraceptives is unconstitutional). See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACErTION: A
HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS (1986).
113, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
114, Id. at 757-59. The Court did point to two historical references to bolster its finding a
fundamental right to travel. First, it quoted a passage from the Articles of Confederation: "the
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State." Id. at 758
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Articles of Confederation, Art. IV). Second, it claimed that
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Tradition reveals a different story. Due to legal proscriptions and
practical considerations, many Americans traditionally have not enjoyed
a right to interstate travel. Black Americans and poor Americans,
among others, have been prohibited, by operation of law, from traveling
between states. For example, an 1845 Illinois statute provided that "No
black or mulatto person shall be permitted to reside in this State, until
such person shall produce to the county commissioners' court where he
or she is desirous of settling, a certificate of his or her freedom," and
shall post a $1,000 bond "conditioned that such person will not, at any
time, become a charge to said county, or any other county of this State,
as a poor person."' 15 This law targeted all "blacks and mulattos," not
just slaves, as well as the indigent.
Such race- and class-based restrictions on interstate travel were the
norm, not the exception. Antebellum Kentucky, for example, employed
a certificate system, which prohibited any indigent person from traveling
to Kentucky from another state unless the individual's home state certi-
fied that it would post sufficient money for the person's upkeep.' 16
Through the mid-nineteenth century, a plethora of other state laws
imposed similar race- and/or class-based restrictions on interstate
travel. ' "
None but wealthy white Americans have traditionally enjoyed the
right to interstate travel. Relying on history-giving agency to such
race- and class-based traditions-likely would have prohibited finding a
fundamental right to interstate travel.
E. Right to Vote for Free
Building on Reynolds v. Sims,'"1 the Court held in Harper v. Vir-
the right to interstate travel "goes back at least as far as 1904." /d. at 759. Nonetheless, the Guest
Court's references to tradition are dwarfed by its reliance on precedent.
115. 1845 Illinois Revised Statutes, ch. LXXIV, at 387-91 (Mar. 3, 1845), cited in Willian P.
Quigley, The Quicksands of the Poor Law: Poor Relief Legislation in a Growing Nation, 1790-
1820, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. I, 40 (1997).
116. See Quigley, supra note 115, at 82 n.571 (citing 1795 Ky. Acts, ch. 55, § 6, at 87-88).
This certificate system was also used in America's Northwest Territory. See id. (citing "A law for
relief of the poor," § 17-28 (June 19, 1795), 1 Laws of the North-West Territory, at 136-45
(Theodore Pease ed.)).
117. See Seth F. Kreimer, Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel,
and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 501-02 (1992).
See, e.g., Ohio Acts of 1828, § I at 53 (Feb. 12, 1829) (prohibiting Black and Mulatto persons
from gaining legal settlement in Ohio), cited in Quigley, supra note 115, at 80 n.566; "An Act
concerning Free Negroes and Mulattoes, Servants and Slaves," 1831 Indiana Revised Statutes, ch.
66, § I, at 375 (Feb. 10, 1831) (prohibiting all "black and mulatto" persons from entering Indiana
until they posted a five hundred dollar bond "conditioned that such person shall not at any time
become a charge to the said county"), cited in Quigley, supra note 115, at 81 & n.569.
118. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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ginia State Board of Elections' '9 that there is a fundamental right to vote
for free. The Court relied exclusively on precedent (Reynolds) in assess-
ing the plaintiff's fundamental rights argument. 20 It explicitly rejected
a historical inquiry: "[The Fourteenth Amendment] is not shackled to the
political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are consti-
tutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic
notions of equality . . ,.2.
Of course, the Court needed to disclaim the use of tradition because
tradition flatly does not support the fundamental right to vote for free, a
point not lost on Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart, who dissented.
Black was troubled that the Court would invalidate the "long-standing
beliefs that making the payment of a tax a prerequisite to voting" is
permissible.' 22  Harlan and Stewart provided evidence to support
Black's appeal to tradition. They relied on the fact that "[p]roperty qual-
ifications and poll taxes have been a traditional part of our political
structure."' 2 3 An overwhelming majority of the American colonies
imposed poll taxes, and many states exacted such taxes for most of their
histories. 24 Meanwhile, two states, Mississippi and Virginia, continued
to impose a poll tax at the time the Harper Court issued its opinion,1 5
and Vermont rescinded its poll tax only one month before Harper.26
District courts declared Alabama's and Texas's poll taxes unconstitu-
tional three weeks and six weeks earlier, respectively. 2  The dissents
also pointed to arguments by Aristotle, Tocqueville, and representatives
at the Constitutional Convention to buttress their claim that tradition
does not support a fundamental right to vote for free.' 28
Asked to rely on this classist tradition, the Harper Court felt com-
pelled not to perpetuate such injustice. While the upper-class-biased tra-
dition of the United States dictates that only wealthy individuals should
vote, the Court repudiated such discrimination, finding it inappropriate
to infuse such subjugation into its fundamental rights jurisprudence.
119. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
120. See id.
121. Id. at 669.
122. Id. at 677.
123. hi. at 684.
124. See id. (citing FREDERiC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH 2 (1958); 1 FRANCES
NEWTON THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: 1776-1850, at 92-98
(1898); Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy: 1760-1860, at 1-4
(1960)).
125. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 666 (citing statutes); id. at 680 n.I
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 666 n.4.
127. See United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 255 (W.D. Tex. 1966); United States v.
Alabama, 252 F Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1966).
128. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 685 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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F. Two Fundamental Rights Recognized by Lower Courts
The Supreme Court's fundamental rights opinions are significantly
more nuanced than similar lower court opinions. While this article
focuses on Supreme Court rulings, it is important to note that lower
courts' fundamental rights opinions are as erratic, if not more so, than
those issued by the Supreme Court. The following lower court deci-
sions, like the Supreme Court opinions above, probably would have
reached a different outcome had the courts relied on tradition.
1. RIGHT TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROCREATION
Emerging technology throws another wrench into the use of tradi-
tion in assessing purported fundamental rights. Gerber v. Hickman 129
and Lifchez v. Hartigan3 ' both involved the problem of how to "update"
the right of privacy to account for technological advances.
In Lifchez, the Northern District of Illinois struck down a state law
providing that "[n]o person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus . . .
unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus. . . . ""' Relying
exclusively on precedent, the court held that the law "impermissibly
restricts a woman's fundamental right of privacy, in particular, her right
to make reproductive choices free of governmental interference with
those choices."' 3 2 The court found that a woman's right to embryo
transfer and chorionic villi sampling are protected fundamental rights by
finding the conduct subsumed under the Supreme Court's reproductive
freedom cases, such as Roe v. Wade.'33 The Lifchez court noted that
embryo transfer and chorionic villi sampling, for example, are punisha-
ble by Illinois' statute even though they fit within the "cluster of consti-
tutional choices" guaranteed by the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. "
Gerber found, for the first time, a fundamental right for a life-term
prisoner to father a child by artificially inseminating his wife.' 35
According to the dissent, the court found a fundamental right of a pris-
129. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc). The Gerber en banc majority opinion held that a prisoner does not have a fundamental
right to procreate while incarcerated because procreation is "inconsistent with incarceration."
Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623.
130. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
131. Id. at 1363 (citing 111. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38 $I 81-26, § 6(7) (1989) ("Illinois Abortion Law")).
The Illinois Abortion Law expressly exempted in vitro fertilization. See id.
132. Id. at 1376 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
133. Id. at 1377.
134. Id.
135. Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001).
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oner "to mail his semen from prison so that his wife can be artificially
inseminated," or a fundamental "right to procreate from prison via
FedEx."' 36 The Gerber court relied exclusively on precedent, extending
Carey v. Population Services, International'3 7 and Stanley v. Illinois,3 '
among others, to prisoners.'39
Neither court would have found the respective fundamental rights
had they relied on tradition to assess the fundamentality of those rights.
First, and most obviously, the technology involved in such procedures
(e.g., embryo transfer, chorionic villi sampling, and artificial insemina-
tion by donor) are of recent vintage. 4 ° If the reviewing court is to
assess the purported fundamental right at its greatest specificity, as the
Supreme Court has hinted it must,'4 then such rights cannot survive the
tradition test. Moreover, to the extent that such procedures have been
available, they have been accessible only to the wealthiest of Americans.
The vast majority of Americans have not and do not have the option of
receiving an embryo transfer, for example, because it is prohibitively
expensive'42 and because most insurance policies do not cover such a
136. Id. at 893 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
137. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
138. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
139. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 887.
140. For a discussion of chorionic villi sampling and other new procedures that implicate
reproductive rights, see generally Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive
Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MiD. 35 (2000); David T. Morris, Cost Containment an/d Reproductive
Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic Screening atd the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 AM.
J.L. & Mi:). 295 (1994).
141. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 ("Though the dissent hits no
basis for the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which
a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."). But
see LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1428 (2d ed. 1988) ("[l]n asking
whether an alleged right forms part of a [fundamental right], it is crucial to define the [right] at a
high enough level of generality to permit unconventional variants to claim protection along with
mainstream versions of protected conduct."). Footnote six of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court
in Michael H. has received significant attention. See. e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 8, at 97-98
("Justice Scalia's footnote 6 ... seems destined to take its place alongside Justice Stone's famous
footnote 4 [in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)] as one of
constitutional law's most provocative aides .... "); Crump, supra note 8, at 859-60. See generally
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition ofRights, 57 U. CHt.
L. Ri-v. 1057 (1990). It should be noted that even Justice Scalia himself hits not always adhered
to assessing the purported fundamental right at the "most specific level." See Crump, supra note
8, at 870-71 ("Unlike his analysis of rights at the most specific level of definition, Justice Scalia's
opinion in Cruzan did not analyze this tradition of state power at the most specific level. Instead,
he considered a general power of suicide prevention.") (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294-300 (1990)).
142. See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic, and Legal Barriers to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Emploved by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE7 L. 147, 160 (2000); Aaron C. McKee, The American Dream-2.5 Kids atd a White Picket
Fence: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect the hlisurance Rights o1 h'tfertile Couples, 41
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procedure. 43 Thus, it cannot be said that, even if historically technically
available, such procedures, and therefore the fundamental right to
undergo such procedures, are deeply rooted in the nation's traditions.
2. RIGHT TO ACUPUNCTURE
While the right to abortion and the right to use contraceptives are
well-known fundamental rights, there are many lesser-known fundamen-
tal rights. The right to acupuncture treatment is one such example. The
Southern District of Texas, in Andrews v. Ballard,'44 held that a Texas
State Board of Medical Examiners Rule providing that only licensed
physicians can practice acupuncture violated the plaintiffs' fundamental
right to obtain acupuncture treatment. 4 5
The court's methodology for recognizing such a right was unclear.
The court stated that purported rights must satisfy two criteria in order to
be deemed fundamental: "First, they must be 'personal decisions.' ...
Second, they must be 'important decisions.'"46 Though the court
ostensibly derived this test from Carey, it admitted that "these criteria
are not expressed as such in Carey."'4 7
Nowhere did Andrews mention tradition, and with good reason.
American tradition does not support the fundamental right to receive
acupuncture treatment. The Andrews court admitted, while explaining
acupuncture, that acupuncture is relatively unknown to the "Western sci-
entific community."' 48 While acupuncture has a 5,000-year history, it
has been relegated to "experimental" status in the United States due to
the ethnocentrism of the medical community,' 4 ' which often considers
acupuncture, like other alternative medical techniques, to be "dubious,"
"fraudulent," and "quackery."' 5  Andrews did not soil its reasoning with
prejudice, however. Had it done so-had tradition been its guide-there
would be no fundamental right to such medical treatment.
The Andrews court was one of many that refused to legitimize prior
WASHBURN L.J. 191, 195 (2001) (noting that "high-tech artificial reproductive technologies ...
are expensive," approximately $10,000 per attempt).
143. See McKee, supra note 142, at 195.
144. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
145. See id. at 1048 (commenting that "the decision to obtain acupuncture treatment is ...
encompassed by the right of privacy").
146. Id. at 1046 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 684 (1977)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1043. See also Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including Alternative and
Complementary Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 83, 108 (1996)
(explaining that acupuncture is considered "experimental" in the United States because it "doles]
not share the basic assumptions of Western medicine").
149. See Cohen, supra note 148, at 108.
150. Aimee Doyle, Alternative Medicine and Medical Malpractice, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 533,
536-37 (2001).
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discrimination. Instead of injecting a discriminatory past into their anal-
yses, these courts resorted to alternative methods for assessing purported
fundamental rights. Relying on tradition would not only have given
agency to prior discrimination, it would have, as shown above, negated
much of our fundamental rights doctrine. Perhaps this is the intention of
members of the judiciary who employ tradition to assess fundamental
rights.' 5' For this reason, among others explored below, legal advocates
and jurists must resist the call to rely on tradition in fundamental rights
jurisprudence.
IV. TRADITION'S INHERENT PLASTICITY
Whether done consciously or not, judges frequently rely on histori-
cal analyses that are either likely incorrect or, at a minimum, subject to
multiple inconsistent interpretations. This is not a novel observation.
As one commentator subtly quipped, "the Supreme Court is not known
for its historical meticulousness."'5 2 While some historical inaccuracies
can surely be ascribed to innocent misinterpretations or historical sloppi-
ness, a more cynical explanation perhaps undergirds the judiciary's
dubious interpretations of tradition. That is, history is subject to many
interpretations, especially in a nation as diverse as the United States, and
judges may pick and choose historical interpretations to suit their per-
sonal and political ideologies. A critical evaluation of jurists' historical
interpretations, much like an honest assessment of American history
texts, would reveal that they "choose [their] history, or more accurately,
... select those vistas of history ... which promise [them] the greatest
satisfaction." 53
Another obvious though overlooked point is that judges, like his-
torians or any of us, often interpret history from the only perspective
they know: their own. What matters in a profound way for the present
inquiry is that such biases are naturally reflected in fundamental rights
assessments when such rights are dependent on tradition. Jurists, who
151. Professor Brown has asserted that "this use of tradition is but a thinly-veiled effort to cut
off all possibility of progressive interpretation of the past." Brown, supra note 5, at 202. See also
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 8, at 104 ("Justice Scalia is aware that his tradition-bound approach to
constitutional interpretation would severely curtail the Supreme Court's role in protecting
individual liberties .... [S]uch a curtailment would seem to be the purpose of his method.");
Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv.
1373, 1375 (1991) (commenting that employing tradition as an exclusive tool to assess purported
fundamental rights "would undermine ... virtually every major substantive due process case of
the last twenty years").
152. Brown, supra note 5, at 191. See also TRIBE & DORF, supra note 8, at 98, 99
(commenting that "historical traditions are susceptible to even greater manipulation than are legal
precedents" and referring to the "manipulability of historical traditions").
153. SAMUEL D. MARBLE, BEFORE COLUMBUS 25 (1989).
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are historically white, wealthy, straight men, 15 are frequently asked in
fundamental rights opinions to interpret traditions concerning race, class,
sexual orientation, gender, and other areas about which they often pos-
sess a rather monolithic understanding. Jurists' dominant positionality
is thus usually reflected in judicial opinions in ways that perpetuate such
dominance.
In short, contrary to the exhortations of the proponents of using
tradition in fundamental rights jurisprudence, tradition does not provide
a "neutral principle."'' 1 5 The words of the preeminent American histo-
rian and professor, Howard Zinn, are worth noting:
It is not possible [to be an objective historian] .... What you get in a
history lecture is a selection by the writer ... and that selection is
made according to that ... writer's bias, and there's no way of avoid-
ing that. What I always tell my students from the outset is that
they're not going to get an objective history because they're going to
get my point of view .... 156
A serious examination of the use of tradition in fundamental rights
jurisprudence therefore raises important questions regarding whose tra-
dition is relevant to the fundamental rights analysis. Even if we are to
accept that the relevant tradition is that of the United States, 151 we are
still left with myriad traditions upon which to base our fundamental
rights analysis. The tradition led by Jefferson Davis is certainly differ-
ent from that blazed by Angela Davis. Is the tradition inspired by the
Black Panthers any less legitimate than that epitomized by the White
Knights? Why should we recognize the tradition of the English-only
movement any more than that of the American Indian movement? It
seems inappropriate to give more credence to one tradition than another
only because it had a greater following, regardless of the relative moral-
154. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment
on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 662 (1994) (exploring the unconscious biases ofjurists due to
their "overwhelming" positionality as "white, male, middle-aged or older, and wealthy"); Frank B.
Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 914 (2001) (noting that "judges are
almost exclusively male, white, and wealthy") (internal quotation omitted).
155. For arguments that tradition injects a "neutral principle" into fundamental rights
jurisprudence, see, for example, Bopp & Coleson, supra note 70, at 282 (characterizing tradition
as "objective" and a "neutral principle"); McConnell, supra note 70, at 672 (referring to "objective
historical fact") (emphasis added). For an analysis of "neutral principles" in general, see Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivisin and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
156. Audio tape: Howard Zinn interview on KPFK, 90.7 FM, Los Angeles, Cal. (on file with
author).
157. But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711-12 (1997) (plurality opinion)
(relying on the "Anglo-American common law tradition"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
197-98 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring) (citing European traditions); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 169 (1952) (inquiring into the traditions of "English-speaking peoples"); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 111-12 (1934) (citing English and Welsh traditions).
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ity of the traditions. 158
What these questions evince is that, contrary to the claims of the
proponents of employing tradition in fundamental rights analysis, invok-
ing tradition does not provide certainty. Rather, it subjects fundamental
rights to the whims of judges' accounts of history, which often, though
not always, denigrates fundamental rights analysis into a recitation of
the "polemics of the victor."' 59 While advocates of employing tradition
in fundamental rights jurisprudence claim that tradition serves to con-
strain jurists, it often does no such thing.
The following fundamental rights cases are examples of tradition
possibly being interpreted "incorrectly"-to the extent that there is an
"incorrect" historical interpretation-to arrive at a certain holding. The
opinions demonstrate the malleability and subjectivity of tradition,
including the importance of jurists' positionality in issuing a tradition-
based fundamental rights opinion.
A. Both Sides of the Coin
In these cases, the majority and dissenting opinions each rely on
tradition to bolster their fundamental rights analyses. In such instances,
tradition is invoked both to find a fundamental right and to find that
there is no such right, providing examples of the pliability of tradition.
1. RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
The Second Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court all have
ruled on whether one possesses a fundamental right to physician-assisted
suicide. All three courts have used tradition to assess the fundamentality
of physician-assisted suicide, with the Supreme Court and Second Cir-
cuit finding that tradition does not support such a right, and the Ninth
158. See Ely, supra note 12, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted):
There is obvious room to maneuver, along continua of both space and time, on the
subject of which tradition to invoke. Whose traditions? ... And who is to say that
the "tradition" must have been one endorsed by a majority? Is Henry David
Thoreau an invocable part of American tradition? John Brown? John Calhoun?
Jesus Christ? It is hard to see why not. Top all of this off with the tremendous
uncertainties in ascertaining anything very concrete about the intellectual or moral
climates o1 ages passed, and one is in a position to prove almost anything to those
who are predisposed to have it proved or, more candidly, to admit that tradition does
not really generate an answer ....
See also L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Note, Justice Scalia's History and Tradition: The Chief
Nightmare it Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REV. 581, 596 (1992) ("Inherent in a
methodology grounded in history and tradition is the choice of which history and whose
tradition.").
159. LOrWEN, supra note 2, at 38 (referring to accounts of history in general) (citation
omitted). See also GEORGE ORWFLL, 1984, at 35 (1949) (commenting that "[wlho controls the
present controls the past").
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Circuit, sitting en banc, using tradition to find that the right to physician-
assisted suicide is fundamental.
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,6 ° the Ninth Circuit stated
that "historical evidence alone is not a sufficient basis for rejecting a
claimed liberty interest,"' 16' and simultaneously provided a historical
analysis supporting a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide.
The court first pointed to the fact that "[e]ven when prohibited [by law],
... assisted-suicides flourished in back alleys, in small street-side clin-
ics, and in the privacy of the bedroom."'' 62 It also found it relevant that
"suicide was often considered commendable" in the Greek and Roman
empires,163 and further bolstered its historical conclusion with the Old
Testament and writings of European philosophers, including Monte-
squieu, Voltaire, Hume, Donne, and Sir Thomas More.' 64 Finally, the
court examined the American tradition, noting that nearly half of the
original colonies had decriminalized suicide by 1798, that "[t]here is no
evidence that any court ever imposed a punishment for suicide or
attempted suicide under common law in post-revolutionary America,"
and that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, less
than one-quarter of the states proscribed assisted-suicide. 65
The Ninth Circuit opinion is not the only published work that has
recognized tradition's support of physician-assisted suicide. For
instance, some commentators have acknowledged that the Bible does not
condemn suicide and that the Greeks and Romans explicitly approved of
it in certain circumstances. 166 Moreover, there is widespread acceptance
that suicide was encouraged in certain East Asian cultures. 67
As the Ninth Circuit admitted, though, the historical record is not
conclusive, 68 and the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit, as well as
160. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
161. Id. at 805. At other times, the court proclaimed that "[t]here is no litmus test for courts to
apply when deciding whether or not a liberty interest exists under the Due Process Clause," id. at
802, and that "the limits of the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause are not frozen at any
point in time." Id. at 804.
162. Id. at 801.
163. Id. at 806. The court cited Greek mythology, Socrates, Plato, the Stoics, and Roman law.
See id. at 806-08.
164. See id. at 808.
165. See id. at 809.
166. See Mark K. Frederick, Physician Assisted Suicide: A Personal Right?, 21 S.U. L. REV.
59, 62-63 (1994).
167. See SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 257-60 (Norman L. Farberow ed., 1975), cited ill
Frederick, supra note 166, at 664 n. 14. Suicide in Japan was encouraged in order to salvage honor
in the face of failure, to show bravery and honor, to serve a master in the after-life, and to appease
the gods of war. See id.
168. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801, 806 (noting that the "historical record is ...
checkered").
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a dissenting opinion in Compassion in Dying, all relied upon tradition to
find that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide. In
Washington v. Glucksberg,'69 the Supreme Court claimed that existing
state statutory prohibitions against assisted suicide are "longstanding
expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation
of all human life," and cited "over 700 years [of] Anglo-American com-
mon law tradition."' 7 ° The Court then engaged in an exhaustive analysis
of the American colonies' and states' histories of prohibiting assisted
suicide, concluding that such a tradition has been recently
"reaffirmed."'
The Court cited the dissenting opinion in Compassion in Dying,'
an opinion that engaged in its own lengthy discussion of the tradition of
assisted suicide.' 73 The Ninth Circuit dissent borrowed from the usual
suspects, including Plato, Aristotle, de Bracton, Locke, Sir Edward
Coke, and Blackstone, in order to find that there should be no fundamen-
tal right to assisted suicide. 174 It also looked to criminal proscriptions
against suicide in the United States in the colonial era, the late nine-
teenth century, and the modern era.171
The Second Circuit, in Quill v. Vacco, 176 undertook a similar exam-
ination, relying on English common law and American statutory prohibi-
tions of suicide to find that assisted suicide is not "deeply rooted in the
nation's traditions and history."'' 77 Each of these opinions, Glucksberg,
Quill, and the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion and dissent in Compas-
sion in Dying, looked to the "same" tradition, yet came up with disparate
results. Far from providing certainty, tradition yielded conflicting opin-
ions, requiring the Supreme Court to resolve the split between the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits.
169. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
170. Id. at 710-11. The Court cited Henry de Bracton, Blackstone's Commentaries, and a
1561-1562 English case, among other sources. See id. at 711-12 & n.10.
171. Id. at 712-16. The Court did not rest merely on such a tradition in the United States and
Europe. It also found that the Canadian Supreme Court denied a claim that there is a fundamental
right to assisted suicide and that Australia rejected a proposed "Death with Dignity Bill." Id. at
718 n.16. The Court noted, however, that Colombia's Constitutional Court had recently
"legalized voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill people." Id.
172. See id. at 710 n.8.
173. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 845-50 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 845-46.
175. See id. at 846-47.
176. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
177. Id. at 724. The court also consulted a number of scholarly examinations of assisted
suicide, including Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519 (1995), and Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional
Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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2. RIGHT TO ABORTION
Roe v. Wade, perhaps the most famous fundamental rights opinion,
is notable for a number of reasons, not the least of which is its employ-
ment of tradition. At the time it was issued, Roe involved the most
extensive analysis of tradition of any fundamental rights opinion-and
possibly the most exhaustive historical analysis in American jurispru-
dence. It is also noteworthy because both the Court's majority opinion
and the dissent used tradition to bolster their opposing fundamental
rights conclusions.
While the majority opinion in Roe never explicitly stated that it was
relying on tradition to find the fundamental right to an abortion, its
nearly twenty-page discussion of the history of abortion precedes its
finding that there is such a fundamental right.' 78 The Court examined
ancient attitudes toward abortion, the Hippocratic Oath, the common
law, English statutory law, American law, the position of the American
Medical Association, and the policy of the American Public Health
Association.' 79 While the Court's rendition of the tradition of abortion
is far too lengthy and nuanced to recount here, suffice it to say that the
analysis was comprehensive, beginning with societal attitudes in the Per-
sian Empire and in the Greek and Roman eras, and ending in 1972, one
year before the opinion was issued.' 8 °
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Roe, used tradition to
find that there should be no fundamental right to an abortion. His histor-
ical analysis consisted primarily of reciting state statutes that criminal-
ized abortion:
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all the majority
sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at
least a century is a strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted
right to an abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."''
8
'
Rehnquist also found it relevant that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not contemplate the right to abortion, noting that at the
time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, thirty-six Ameri-
can states or territories had enacted laws prohibiting abortion, twenty-
one of which were still on the books when Roe was issued.
82
While Rehnquist theorized that "the only conclusion possible from
178. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
179. See id. at 129-47.
180. See id. at 130, 140, & n.37.
181. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
182. See id. at 174-75 & nn.I, 2 (listing the state and territory statutes).
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this history" is that there should be no fundamental right to abortion,'83
the majority opinion reached the opposite conclusion. Following the
most exhaustive examination of tradition to date, the best that could be
said was that "[t]he historical record on the issue of abortion appears to
be one of rough equipoise-and of considerable ambiguity-hardly the
raw material from which clear fundamental rights can be fashioned."' 4
3. RIGHT TO HAVE VOTES COUNTED EQUALLY
Reynolds v. Sims established the fundamental right to have votes
counted equally. As with the cases assessing a right to assisted suicide
and a right to abortion, however, tradition was employed both to find
that the right should and should not exist. The majority's opinion relied
on a history of "a continuing expansion of the scope of the right to suf-
frage."' 85 The majority noted that "[t]he Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nine-
teenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution all involve expansions of the right of suffrage,"' 186 that "the
right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of
our political system,"' 87 and that granting unequal weight to votes
"run[s] counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government."'
Nonetheless, the dissenting Justices recognized that tradition may
be interpreted to militate in favor of not finding a fundamental right to
have one's vote counted equally. 89 Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds
seized on such a historical interpretation. While admitting that "the
political history and practices of this country from its earliest beginnings
leave wide room for debate,"' 0 Harlan looked to the debate surrounding
the proposal and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to upset "the power of
183. Id. at 177.
184. Steegrnann, supra note 8, at 394.
185. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
186. Id. at 555 n.28.
187. id. at 562.
188. Id. at 564. The Court quoted James Wilson, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention
and later a Supreme Court Justice: "[A.il elections ought to be equal. Elections are equal, when a
... proportion of the representatives and of the constituents will remain invariably the same." Id.
at 564 n.41 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (quoting 2 WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON (James D. Andrews ed., 1896))).
189. See id. at 565 (commenting that American "society [is] ostensibly grounded on
representative government") (emphasis added); id. at 579 ("History indicates, however, that many
States have deviated [from proportional representation]."). The Court, perhaps admitting the
weakness in its historical analysis, cautioned that "history alone" should not "justify disparities
from population-based representation." Id. at 579-80.
190. Id. at 590.
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the States to apportion their legislatures as they saw fit."'' He also
detailed the tradition of states counting votes unequally.'
92
Basically, it is immaterial for the present purpose which side was
"correct" if, indeed, there is a "correct" historical position. What is per-
tinent here is that tradition was employed to support both the majority's
finding of a fundamental right and the dissent's opinion that there should
be no fundamental right. Tradition provided neither meaningful gui-
dance nor certainty in assessing the fundamental right to have votes
counted equally.
B. The Wrong Side of the Coin
In other cases, the majority's fundamental rights conclusions were
based on dubious, though unchallenged, interpretations of tradition.
While the dissents, if any, did not rely on tradition in the following
cases, the majorities' historical conclusions are certainly subject to criti-
cism. Tradition could very well have supported the dissenting opinions.
1. RIGHT TO DIRECT THE EDUCATION OF ONE'S CHILDREN
The Court declared in Meyer v. Nebraska that parents have a funda-
mental right to direct the education of their children. 93 The Meyer
Court found this fundamental right by focusing on the American tradi-
tion of exercising such a right.' 94 Specifically, the Court proclaimed
that it is a "privilege long recognized at common law"' 195 and that "[t]he
American people have always"' 96 held dear their right to direct the edu-
cation of their children, including providing their "children education
suitable to their station in life."' 197 The Court pointed to The Ordinance
of 1787, among other sources, to support its analysis of American
tradition. 98
The Meyer understanding of tradition could be attacked from myr-
iad angles. The obvious example is the restrictions placed upon Black
Americans throughout history. During slavery, Black American parents
were often prohibited by their white owners from teaching their children
to read or write, or from otherwise facilitating their children's educa-
191. Id. at 595. See also id. at 601-02 (claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
supposed to "interfer[e] with the right of the States to regulate the elective franchise").
192. See id. at 603-10.
193. See Myerson v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
194. Id. at 400.
195. Id. at 399.
196. Id. at 400.
197. Id. at 399-400.
198. See id. at 400.
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tion.' 99 In fact, their children's illiteracy often was mandated by law.2"'
Long after emancipation, moreover, Black youths were automatically
refused admittance to most educational institutions, and they continue to
face a relative lack of educational opportunities.2 °'
The Native American experience also belies the alleged tradition
announced in Meyer. Native Americans' right to direct the education of
their children was restricted severely by the government. For example,
throughout much of American history, Native Americans were prohib-
ited from attending schools. 20 2 Many states even criminalized teaching
Native Americans to read and write.20 3
Of course, parents traditionally were not permitted to educate their
daughters in the same manner as their sons. Girls generally were pro-
hibited from attending elementary or secondary school until the twenti-
eth century, and post-secondary education, in particular, traditionally has
been restricted to males.204 In sum, "the withholding of education and
literacy from girls" has been a hallmark of Western society.20 5
Perhaps the Meyer Court was concerned solely with the rights of
parents of rich, white boys when it found that tradition supports the fun-
damental right of parents to direct the education of their children. At the
very least, notwithstanding the Court's reliance on tradition, a strong
argument can be made that tradition does not support the right at issue in
Meyer.
199. See Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and
Disadvantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 680 (1992) (referring to such
restrictions as "masters' rules"). Frederick Douglass explained such laws:
To educate a slave was to make him discontented with slavery ... and to invest in
him a power which could open the treasuries of freedom. Thus .... since the object
of the master was to maintain control over the slave, constant vigilance was
exercised to prevent anything which would militate against or endanger the stability
of his authority.
Id.
200. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 356 n.333 (1996); Judges, supra note 199, at 680 (noting that state laws codified the masters'
rules).
201. See, e.g., Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Re-Cognizing hIequality: Rebellion, Redemption, and
the Struggle for Transcendence in the Equal Protection of the Law, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
9, 49 n.168 (1991) (referring to "the gross disparities in educational opportunities afforded to
lower-income Americans and to minorities"). See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991).
202. See JAMES COLEMAN, EQUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENT IN EDUCATION 19 (1990).
203. See, e.g., Shirley Blancke & Cjigkitoonuppa John Peters Slow Turtle, The Teaching of the
Past of the Native Peoples of North America inl U.S. Schools, in THE EXCLUDED PAST 123 (Peter
Stone & Robert MacKenzie eds., 1990) (discussing a 1789 Massachusetts statute that criminalized
Native American literacy "under penalty of death"); see also LOEWEN, supra note 2, at 129.
204. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD
EQUALITY FROM THE NEW DEAL rO THE PRESENT 221-22 (1991).
205. Anita Bernstein, Engendered By Technology, 80 N.C. L. REV. I, 59 (2001).
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2. RIGHT TO LIVE WITH FAMILY MEMBERS
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court relied extensively on
tradition to find a fundamental right to live with family members,
including members of one's extended family. Although the Court ini-
tially proclaimed that "[d]ue process has not been reduced to any
formula, '20 6 it resorted to tradition almost exclusively in finding such a
right. Moore described as "venerable" the nation's tradition of non-
nuclear family members living together, stating specifically that "[o]ver
the years, millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an
environment. 207
Justice Brennan's concurrence highlighted the "cultural myopia"2 °
of the East Cleveland ordinance that limited the number of unrelated
people who could live in the same dwelling and narrowly defined the
term "unrelated. '' 209 His opinion explored the "tradition of the Ameri-
can home that has been a feature of our society since our beginning as a
Nation," 20 claiming that the "'extended family' ... remains ... a per-
vasive living pattern ....2 Brennan focused on black households, in
which he claimed that living with extended family was "especially
familiar.' 212 He concluded that living with extended family "remains a
vital tenet of our society" and "historically ha[s] been central, and today
remain[s] central, to a large proportion of our population. 213
Brennan's focus on black families is curious in light of history.
Black Americans have spent a majority of their time in the United States
subjugated under slavery, the nation's most systematic breakup of the
family. Slavery, which depended on the separate sales of children and
parents, "forcibly disrupted ... slave families, ' 21 4 essentially institution-
206. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion).
207. Id. at 504-05 (citing, among others, BETTY YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY (1973)).
208. Id. at 507.
209. See id. at 496 n.2 (citing the relevant provisions of the East Cleveland code).
210. Id. at 507.
211. Id. at 508 (citing HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN THE
LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS 45-73, 245-49 (1962)).
212. Moore, 431 U.S. at 509 (citing, among others, YORBURG, supra note 207, at 108; ROBERT
B. HILL, THIE STRENGTHS OF BLACK FAMILIES 5 (1972); J. SCANZONI, THE BLACK FAMILY IN
MODERN SOCIETY 134 (1971); Anderson, The Pains and Pleasures of Old Black Folks, EBONY,
Mar. 1973, at 123, 128-30)).
213. Id. at 510 (citing, among others, NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
BEYOND THE MELTING POT 50-53 (1970)). It should be noted, however, that Moynihan has been
severely criticized for his paternalistic and condescending views about black families, particularly
his understanding of the "weakness in the black family." NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED
LAND: THE GREAT MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 175 (1992). Moynihan's report,
"The Negro Family: The Case for National Action," stirred a national debate and infuriated most
progressive-minded individuals, such as Bayard Rustin and James Farmer. See id. at 172-78
(summarizing that Moynihan's tactic was to "blame the victim").
214. DAVIS, supra note 99, at 14. See also Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacv: A List Resort
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alizing the breakup of black families. As with many of the odious tradi-
tions referenced in this article, the law condoned this history.2t 5
Of course, Blacks are not the only group that systematically has
been discouraged from or denied the opportunity to live with non-
nuclear family members. Native Americans also were enslaved 216 and
subjected to the same forced break-up of the family unit that was exper-
ienced by Black Americans. Moreover, the United States historically
has not accepted the sexual orientation of lesbians and gay men,217 let
alone their cohabitation. Thus, while Brennan's attempt at a culturally
pluralistic opinion is to be applauded, his historical interpretation is, at
the very least, disputable, and more likely incorrect.
3. RIGHT TO KILL PROTECTED WILDLIFE
Not all fundamental rights opinions garner the attention com-
manded by Glucksberg, Reynolds, or Roe; most fundamental rights opin-
ions, many of which are issued by lower courts, do not involve the
spotlight-grabbing rights such as assisted suicide, voting, or abortion.
Nevertheless, these opinions can provide important examples of and
insights into the malleability of tradition.
Christy v. Hodel2"8 is one such opinion. In Christy, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that there is no fundamental right to kill federally protected
wildlife in defense of property.2 '9 The court so held after finding that
the purported right was not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. 22° Unfortunately, the court did not reference the sources it
consulted in arriving at its conclusion.
An historical inquiry could yield a different result, namely that a
right to kill federally protected wildlife in defense of property has been
"well established. ' 22 ' Tradition dating back to the Roman Empire and
Alternative for Infertile Women or a Comnodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 153 (1997) (commenting that "the involuntary breakup of a family unit is at
the heart of what many Americans found most repulsive about slavery").
215. See generally Thomas D. Russell, Articles Sell Best Singly: The Disruption of Slave
Families at Court Sales, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1161, 1162 (concluding that "court sales disrupted
markedly more slave families than noncourt or commercial sales").
216. See, e.g., Tayyab Mahmud, Migration, Identity, and the Colonial Encounter, 76 OR. L.
REV. 633, 640 n.23 (1997) ("Native American slavery was the first large-scale system in the
history of capitalism to exploit the workers of conquered territories outside of Europe. In terms of
its scale and destructive significance, it exceeded the later enslavement of the African people.").
See generally WILBUR R. JACOBs, DISPOSSESSING THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1972).
217. See supra note 83.
218. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
219. See id. at 1330.
220. Id.
221. J.C. Vance, Annotation, Right to Kill Game in Defense of Person or Property, 93
A.L.R.2d 1366, 1368 (1964); see also David S. Klain, Note, Does the Endangered Species Act
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extending "through Western history" can be interpreted to support a
landowner's right to kill whatever wildlife enters her land.222
Perhaps Christy highlights another problem with relying on tradi-
tion to assess fundamental rights. As we have seen, tradition analysis
requires significant research and energy. Lower courts are not well-
equipped to engage in such analysis, considering their relatively short
deadlines and docket congestion. They rarely have the luxury of relying
on amicus briefs, which are much more commonly submitted to the
Supreme Court than to lower courts. In short, tradition is an especially
difficult methodological tool for lower courts to employ.
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court or a lower court is issu-
ing the opinion, using tradition as a methodological tool to assess pur-
ported fundamental rights has resulted in dubious fundamental rights
opinions. At the very least, the inherent plasticity of tradition prevents
the certainty and neutrality that history theoretically provides. In other
words, tradition often does not constrain jurists. Rather, it permits con-
testable fundamental rights rulings that are frequently dependant on the
positionality and political will of the jurist assessing the purported fun-
damental right.
V. TRADITION: A RESULT-ORIENTED APPLICATION
While tradition is supposed to bring stability and certainty to funda-
mental rights jurisprudence, it has produced the opposite result. Along
with the reasons discussed above, this is due, in part, to its uneven,
result-oriented application by jurists. 223  When a jurist believes that
employing tradition may support the desired outcome, she often will rely
on tradition extensively; when she determines that tradition dictates a
less desirable outcome, she usually will avoid tradition entirely.
Thus, almost all Justices are consonant with respect to one aspect of
their use of tradition in fundamental rights analyses: inconsistent
employment of tradition. In fact, only one Justice in the last twenty
years, Justice Scalia, has held uniformly to his convictions regarding the
(non-)applicability of tradition in fundamental rights cases.224 Clearly,
Deprive an Owner of Fundamental Constitutional Rights: Christy v. Hodel, 12 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 421, 429 (1990) (referring to a "long-standing, historical tradition in this country that
establishes that such a right exists").
222. Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Interest and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting
Wildlf'e in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PuB. LAND L. REv. 87, 87 n.3 (1995).
223. Fundamental rights is not the only doctrine in which tradition is used unevenly to satisfy a
jurist's result-oriented outcome. Professor Rebecca Brown, discussing the erratic application of
tradition generally by the judiciary, stated, "[for ... the vast majority, tradition is a powerful
rhetorical device to be brought out when it is favorable (and only to the extent that it is favorable)
to the writer's conclusions." Brown, supra note 5, at 178.
224. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
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the use and abuse of tradition in fundamental rights jurisprudence is not
simply an issue of liberals versus conservatives. Justices covering a
broad spectrum of political ideology have employed or neglected tradi-
tion in order to support their desired fundamental rights outcomes.
Of course, such uneven application does not prove that tradition is a
categorically inappropriate methodological tool; Parts III and IV make
that argument. Nonetheless, it reveals three important points: 1) Justices
are ambivalent about employing tradition; 2) tradition, as applied, does
not ensure the certainty that the methodology is supposed to provide;
and 3) Justices use tradition as a result-oriented method to further their
own political agendas. These observations are borne out when review-
ing the Justices' fundamental rights opinions. They also hopefully pro-
vide some context to and assist in explaining the following Justices'
inconsistent fundamental rights analyses.
A. Justice McReynolds
It is fitting that the Justice credited with introducing tradition as a
methodological tool into non-economic fundamental rights analysis him-
self employed tradition erratically. Setting the stage for the uneven
application of tradition, Justice McReynolds was the first Justice to
invoke tradition in non-economic fundamental rights analysis and, only
two years later, became the first Justice to ignore tradition in non-eco-
nomic fundamental rights analysis.
In 1923, McReynolds ushered non-economic fundamental rights
into American jurisprudence with Meyer. While the Meyer opinion
never explicitly used the term "tradition" and mentioned the phrase
"fundamental right" only once, it was revolutionary in that it success-
fully employed these concepts in a non-economic fundamental rights
case. Concluding that citizens have certain "fundamental rights which
must be respected," to wit, parents' right to control the education of their
children, the Court held that a Nebraska statute that prohibited teaching
any language other than English in certain schools violated plaintiffs'
fundamental right to direct their children's education.225 Without using
the words "tradition" or "history," McReynolds grounded his fundamen-
tal rights analysis in tradition, finding the right to be fundamental
because it was a "privilege long recognized at common law," '26 and
because "[t]he American people have always regarded [such a right] as
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on tradition to assess the purported fundamental
right); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(same); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (same).
225. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 403 (1923).
226. Id. at 399.
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[a] matter of supreme importance. '"2
A mere two years later, McReynolds reversed course, opting to
ignore tradition in another important fundamental rights opinion. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, McReynolds, again writing for the Court,
held that a state statute violated parents' fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of their children.22 8 Failing to heed his former respect for
tradition in assessing fundamental rights, McReynolds relied solely on
precedent (Meyer)229 and a lofty understanding of "liberty" 230 in finding
the fundamental right. McReynolds's vacillation between reverence for
and exclusion of tradition as a methodological tool for assessing pur-
ported fundamental rights opened the door for other Justices' similar
result-oriented, uneven application of tradition in fundamental rights
cases. From Cardozo to Stevens, and nearly all Justices in between,
jurists similarly have utilized tradition only When they have believed
that it supported their desired outcome.
B. Justice Cardozo
Justice Cardozo's fundamental rights opinions span the spectrum of
the uneven application of tradition. Snyder v. Massachusetts,2 3' when
issued in 1934, provided the most detailed tradition analysis of any fun-
damental rights opinion. Holding that a criminal defendant does not pos-
sess a fundamental right to accompany the prosecutor when the
prosecutor takes the jury on a field trip to view the scene of the crime,
Cardozo relied on tradition extensively. Commencing with a statement
that tradition-conscious Justices have repeated often, Cardozo theorized
that a purported right is not fundamental unless restricting it "offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 232 First generalizing that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has not displaced the procedure of the
ages,''233 the Snyder opinion engaged in a thorough examination of his-
tory regarding "showing" the crime scene to the jury. Commenting that
"the viewpoint of history" was dispositive to whether the purported right
227. Id. at 400. McReynolds provided examples from American and world history, see id. at
401-02, which are discussed supra Part IV.B.I.
228. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
229. See id. at 534-35.
230. See id. at 535 ("The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only.").
231. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
232. Id. at 105. For other opinions that have borrowed this phrase, see, for example, Montana
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984).
233. Sydner, 291 U.S. at I11.
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was fundamental,234 the Court cited authority dating back to 1747.235
Moreover, though Cardozo referred to the "traditions and conscience of
our people," '236 he devoted more analysis to "showings" in Europe than
in the United States, buttressing his tradition analysis by citing a bevy of
old English cases, statutes, and commentaries.237 Tradition was the sole
methodological tool used by the Snyder Court to assess the fundamental-
ity of the purported fundamental right.
Cardozo wrote the majority opinion three years later in Palko v.
Connecticut.238 The fundamental rights analysis in Palko could not have
been more different from that in Snyder. While Snyder was saturated
with references to American and British traditions, Palko never refer-
enced a relevant tradition. Assessing whether a criminal defendant has a
fundamental right for the state not to appeal a verdict in a criminal case,
the Court asked solely whether the purported right was "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. ' 239 The Court concluded that such a right
was not fundamental because it was "not of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty."24" Without providing any insight into how
the Court inquired into what constitutes "ordered liberty," it summarily
concluded that "[f]ew would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain
that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible" if the
state were permitted to appeal a verdict in a criminal case.24 '
Snyder and Palko could not be further apart in their methodological
framework for determining the fundamentality of rights. The two opin-
ions are analytically irreconcilable and reflect both a result-oriented
approach and the uneasiness of jurists to employ tradition as an analyti-
cal tool to assess fundamental rights.
234. Id. at 113.
235. See id. at I11.
236. See id. at 105.
237. See. e.g., id. at I I (citing English and Welsh statutes); id. at 112 (citing, inter alia, an
early English case and an 1828 British treatise); id. at 114 (citing Act of 6 George IV, c. 50, §§ 23,
24 (1825)).
238. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
239. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. The Court "assumed for the purpose of the case" that a statute
allowing the federal government to appeal the verdict of a criminal case would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 323.
240. Id. Cardozo's reference to the "'essence of a scheme of ordered liberty' ... became the
basis for the incorporation of most of' the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and
eventuated in making those provisions applicable to the states." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SuitttMt- Couwr o, Tiii UNt'rED STA rts 127 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). While the opinion cited
Snyder for the proposition that a court assessing a purported fundamental right must also ask
whether the right is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental," Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting, inter alia, Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105), the Palko
Court did not conduct any such tradition analysis.
241. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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C. Justice Harlan
Justice Harlan, similarly erratic with respect to his fundamental
rights methodology, introduced a third variable: in addition to employ-
ing tradition exclusively and avoiding it entirely, it can be utilized as a
non-dispositive tool along with other methods. Amazingly, Harlan
invoked all three approaches in five different fundamental rights opin-
ions over the span of eight years.
It was the first of these five opinions, in 1961, in which Justice
Harlan adopted his most nuanced fundamental rights analysis. Dissent-
ing in Poe v. Ullman, Harlan stated an oft-quoted passage:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be
said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has repre-
sented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect
for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and
the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this
Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it cer-
tainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak
is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the tradi-
tions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision
of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive,
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judg-
ment and restraint.
242
Adhering to his belief that no one method could be decisive in
assessing a purported fundamental right, Harlan looked to precedent,243
his personal understanding of the "private realm of family life" and the
242. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961). Many opinions, including Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765-66 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1992) (plurality opinion); and Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion), have cited at least portions of this passage. Later in his
dissent, Harlan, quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952), wrote:
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We
may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits
that bind judges in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due process
of law is not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are
fused in the whole nature of our judicial process. . . . These are considerations
deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 544-45.
243. See id. at 550-51 (stating that "the sweep of the Court's decisions . . . amply shows that
the Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever
character").
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intimacy of "marital relations, ' '"44 and tradition 4 5 to find that a Connect-
icut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violated the fundamental
right of married couples to use contraception.246
Harlan again applied the hybrid methodology in Griswold v. Con-
necticut. Concluding, as he did in Poe, that Connecticut's anti-contra-
ception statute violated married couples' fundamental right to use
contraception, 24 7 Harlan found such a fundamental right by consulting
"the teachings of history,... the basic values that underlie our society,
and ... the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of
powers have played in establishing and preserving American free-
doms." '248 According to Harlan, adherence to these analytical tools and
respect for "the concept of ordered liberty" 249 would suffice to keep
"most judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field ... of the
Due Process Clause. 250
Sandwiched between Poe and Griswold was Reynolds v. Sims. Dis-
senting from the Court's opinion that there is a fundamental right to
have one's vote counted equally with others' votes, Harlan contended
that there was no such fundamental right.251 Although he admitted that
tradition would not yield a clear-cut answer with respect to whether such
a fundamental right existed,252 Harlan's fundamental rights analysis in
Reynolds was informed completely by tradition. He grounded his analy-
sis in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, -2 5 3 as well
as in the actions of the individual states prior to.and after their adopting
the Fourteenth Amendment.254
244. Id. at 552 ("Of this whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult to imagine what is
more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.").
245. See id. at 554-56.
246. See id. at 539. Harlan later commented that the Connecticut statute was "the most
egregiously unconstitutional act that I have seen since being on the Court." Henry S. Cohen,
Book Review, The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985): The Private Discussions Behind
Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions, 48 FED. LAW. 57 (2001) (reviewing THE SUPREME COURT
IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONs BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT
DFCIsIONS (Del Dickson ed., 2001)).
247. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 501.
249. Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
250. Id. at 502.
251. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 614-15 (1964).
252. See id. at 590.
253. See id. at 595-608.
254. See id. at 602-10. In addition, Harlan provided a passing reference to states' voting
schemes in 1964, when Reynolds was issued. See id. at 610-11 (commenting that "it is scarcely
necessary to comment on the situation in the States today"). Moreover, while Harlan included a
subsection entitled "Other Factors," this was merely an afterthought to the tradition subsections,
which were basically dispositive to his fundamental rights analysis. See id. at 611-14.
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Two years later, in another voting rights case, Harlan again dis-
sented from the Court's finding of a fundamental right. This time, in
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, Harlan found that there was
no fundamental right to vote for free. 5 Chastising the majority for
"revert[ing] to the highly subjective judicial approach manifested by
Reynolds," '56 Harlan again resorted exclusively to tradition.257
After eight years of employing history to different extents, Harlan
rounded out his inconsistent application of fundamental right methodol-
ogies in Shapiro v. Thompson.25 8 Dissenting in Shapiro, Harlan con-
cluded that there should be a fundamental right to interstate travel,
notwithstanding his apparent distaste for the doctrine of fundamental
rights. 9 Quixotically, though, he so held only by assessing the pur-
ported fundamental right in light of precedent. 260
It is virtually impossible to make sense of Harlan's erratic employ-
ment of tradition in finding fundamental rights. Over a span of eight
years, Harlan's fundamental rights opinions run the gamut of method-
ological tools to assess purported fundamental rights. Such uneven
application not only evinced his result-oriented approach in such opin-
ions and his ambivalence toward tradition, but also contributed to the
uncertainty in fundamental rights jurisprudence in the 1960s.
D. Justice Powell
By 1973, when Justice Powell wrote the Rodriguez opinion, tradi-
tion had been accepted unequivocally as a methodological tool to assess
purported fundamental rights. It was also clear by 1973 that the Justices
were free to seize upon or ignore tradition without explanation. Thus, it
should come as no surprise that Powell, like so many Justices prior to
his joining the Court and after his retirement, used tradition sporadically
and without justification.
Rodriguez is a perplexing fundamental rights opinion for many rea-
sons, 26 1 one of which is that it is nearly impossible to discern Powell's
255. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 683.
257. See id. at 684-85 (commenting that "[piroperty qualifications and poll taxes have been a
traditional part of our political structure" and citing such pre-Revolutionary requirements).
258. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
259. See id. at 661 (referring to fundamental rights doctrine as "particularly unfortunate and
unnecessary").
260. See id. at 669-71.
261. For other critiques of Rodriguez, see, for example, Developments in the Law-The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights; v. Privacy and Education: The Two Faces of
Fundamental Rights, 95 HARV. L. Rcv. 1429, 1458-59 (1982) (noting a criticism of Rodriguez is
its "textual determinism as a prelude to ruling in favor of plaintiffs"); Susan H. Bitensky,
Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the
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fundamental rights analysis. Powell's uneasiness with fundamental
rights was apparent in Rodriguez:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found
by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to educa-
tion explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.262
After acknowledging that the United States Constitution does not
explicitly recognize a fundamental right to education, the remainder of
the Rodriguez Court's plurality opinion provides no guidance with
respect to how to assess whether a right is implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. 63
Subsequently, Powell not only adopted tradition as a methodologi-
cal tool to assess whether a purported fundamental right is implicitly
protected by the Constitution, he adopted it, at least momentarily, as his
exclusive analytical tool. In Moore, Powell again wrote the plurality
opinion for the Court. In finding a fundamental right to live with
extended family members, Powell departed drastically from his analysis
in Rodriguez, relying on tradition to find the fundamental right. First
theorizing that "[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come...
from careful 'respect for the teachings of history (and) solid recognition
of the basic values that underlie our society,' "264 Powell focused on his
End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 565 (1992) (explaining why the
Rodriguez Court's analysis is a "most unsatisfying way of disposing of the .issue"); and Penelope
A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate
Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 75, 103-13 (1980) (providing four reasons that the
Rodriguez Court should have held that education is a fundamental right).
262. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33 (1973) (citations omitted).
263. Rodriguez relied somewhat on federalism, stating that recognizing a fundamental right to
education would intrude on states' rights. See id. at 40. The decision was also motivated by an
understanding that the judiciary is not the most skilled branch to deal with matters of education:
In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most
persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this
Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature
interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels.
Education . . . presents a myriad of intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems.
Id. at 42 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Perhaps Powell's opinion in Rodriguez was
informed by his experiences as president of the Richmond School Board. See Victoria J. Dodd,
The Education lustice: The Honorable Lewis Franklin Powell, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 683, 688
(2001) ("Justice Powell in Rodriguez was concerned with local stability, the same principles that
apparently guided him in his stewardship of the Richmond school board during desegregation.").
264. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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understanding that "the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." '265
Powell continued his reliance on tradition in assessing purported
fundamental rights in his concurrence in Zablocki v. Redhail. Neverthe-
less, Powell's reiteration in Zablocki that a right is fundamental only if
violating it "is contrary to deeply rooted traditions" '266 was the last time,
except for in a footnote in his concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick,267
that he would rely on tradition in a fundamental rights case. The only
other fundamental rights opinion Powell would write after Zablocki was
as a retired Justice sitting by designation for the Eleventh Circuit. In
Picou v. Gillum,26 8 Powell held for the Eleventh Circuit that a motorcy-
clist did not possess a fundamental right to ride unencumbered by head-
gear.269  Though Powell indicated that a court assessing the
fundamentality of a right should consider history, policy, and "logic,"27
he engaged in no such analysis in Picou. Instead, reverting to Rodri-
guez-style analysis, Powell lets the reader guess why he found no such
fundamental right.27' Perhaps it is because of his discomfort with funda-
mental rights in general that Powell was ultimately unwilling to adopt an
analytical framework to assess purported fundamental rights. Nonethe-
less, if he seriously believed that "an approach grounded in history
imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based
on [an] abstract formula," '272 his avoidance of history is problematic, and
evinces a result-oriented approach to fundamental rights.
E. Chief Justice Warren
As discussed above, the Warren Court welcomed fundamental
rights into mainstream jurisprudence. While the Warren Court produced
some of the most memorable fundamental rights opinions, it also fos-
tered the uneven application of tradition in assessing alleged fundamen-
tal rights. It is therefore not surprising that Chief Justice Warren himself
was not immune from invoking tradition only when he believed it suited
his interests.
Warren wrote Loving v. Virginia, a landmark Warren Court opin-
265. Id. at 503.
266. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 499, 503-04).
267. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 ("I cannot say that conduct condemned for
hundreds of years has now become a fundamental right.").
268. Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519 (11 th Cir. 1989).
269. See id. at 1521-22.
270. See id. at 1522.
271. The only readily discernible interpretive tool employed by Powell in Picou is federalism.
See id. (commenting that "the desirability of laws such as the Florida helmet requirement is a
matter for citizens and their elected representatives to decide").
272. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.12 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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ion. A blend of liberal rhetoric and unsupported presumptions, the two-
paragraph fundamental rights opinion was nearly devoid of analysis.
Recognizing one's fundamental right to marry a person of another race,
Loving relied solely on judicial precedent and Warren's personal outrage
regarding Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute.273
Two years later, in Shapiro v. Thompson, Warren's dissenting opin-
ion was as analytically puzzling as his Loving opinion. Departing from
all of the methodologies discussed above, Warren, assessing the pur-
ported fundamental right to interstate travel, asserted that "[t]he core
inquiry is the extent of the governmental restriction imposed and the
extent of the necessity for the restriction. 2 74 Warren then weighed the
government's restriction imposed on the alleged right against the possi-
ble legislative justifications for the restrictions. 5
It should hardly be surprising, given the Justices' predictably incon-
stant applications of tradition in assessing fundamental rights, that War-
ren's analysis in his other major fundamental rights opinion relies
heavily on tradition. Finding a fundamental right to have one's vote
count equally with others' votes, Warren, writing for the Court in Reyn-
olds, focused mostly on tradition in assessing the purported right.276
Referring to "[t]he original constitutions of 36 of our States," the North-
west Ordinance, and the musings of Thomas Jefferson, among others,
Warren's fundamental rights analysis in Reynolds was saturated with
historical facts.277
Again, with these three opinions issued by Warren within five years
of each other, it is hard to conclude that Warren's ignoring or invoking
tradition was evidence of anything but a result-driven application of tra-
dition and a personal uneasiness with tradition itself.
F. Chief Justice Burger
Much like his predecessor, Chief Justice Burger engaged in a
273. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). After quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942), Warren summarily concluded: "Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or
not marry a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
274. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
275. See id. Warren also relied on precedent. See id. at 652-53 (commenting that "the Court's
opinion ... seems to have departed from our precedents" and examining some of these precedents
in light of the Shapiro Court's holding).
276. The Reynolds Court relied secondarily on precedent. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 560-61 (1964). Countering much of the Reynolds opinion, Warren later admits that "history
alone" is not a "permissible facto[r] in attempting to justify disparities from population-based
representation." Id. at 579-80.
277. See id. at 573. For a discussion of the Court's historical interpretation in Reynolds, see
supra Part IV.A.3.
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result-oriented, inconsistent application of tradition in his fundamental
rights opinions. His first such opinion, dissenting in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
concluded that there should not be a general fundamental right to use
contraception. 278 The dissent was marked by Burger's antipathy for fun-
damental rights, lamenting at one point that the Court was "regrettably
hark[ing] back to the heyday of substantive due process. '"279 Refusing to
engage in any systematic fundamental rights analysis, Burger pithily
stated, "I see nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or any other part of
the Constitution that even vaguely suggests that these medicinal forms
of contraceptives must be available in the open market."'28 His analy-
sis-what little there was of it-focused on states' rights to regulate
health issues.28'
Burger's only other significant fundamental rights opinion was,
analytically speaking, 180 degrees different from his approach in Eisen-
stadt. In his concurrence in Bowers, Burger adopted a clear approach to
assess fundamental rights: almost every word of his concurrence
reflected his new-found reverence for tradition.282 Underscoring that
"proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots,"' Burger cited
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical codes, a statute enacted during the
English Reformation, Blackstone's Commentaries of English law, and
practices in the American colonies.283 The most current source he cited
284
was an 1816 Georgia statute.
It is certainly possible that Burger awoke to a fundamental rights
epiphany sometime between 1972 and 1986, when Eisenstadt and Bow-
ers, respectively, were issued. Nevertheless, tradition as a methodologi-
cal tool to assess purported fundamental rights was, as discussed above,
invoked many times prior to 1972. His ignoring it in Eisenstadt and
employing it in Bowers mimics the analyses of the Justices mentioned
above and below, who used tradition sporadically to suit their desired
result.
278. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 471-72 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 467.
280. Id. at 471-72.
281. Burger commented that the Court's opinion "seriously invade[s] the constitutional
prerogatives of the States ...." Id. at 467. The remainder of Burger's dissent focused on the
right of Massachusetts to "seek to protect health by regulating contraceptives." Id. at 469.
282. The last two sentences of his concurrence did, however, refer to states' rights. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Nonetheless, the
references to states' rights were but an afterthought to the long paragraph preceding it, which dealt
exclusively with tradition. See id at 196-97.
283. Along with the statute mentioned in the text accompanying infra note 284, this list
constitutes the entire authority on which Burger based his opinion. See id.
284. See id. at 197.
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G. Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall wrote far fewer fundamental rights opinions than
one might expect. The few that he did write, however, were analytically
vastly different from one other.
Marshall's first foray into fundamental rights was in Stanley v.
Georgia. Holding that there is a fundamental right to possess obscene
material, Stanley relied on little more than vague notions of "our scheme
of individual liberty." '285 Without bolstering the central holding of Stan-
ley with any citation, Marshall concluded for the Court that "the right to
be free ... from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy"
is fundamental, and that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. 286
Marshall did not mention tradition in Zablocki any more than he
did in Stanley. Finding a fundamental right to marry, Marshall grounded
his fundamental rights analysis solely in precedent.287 Considering the
conspicuous absence of tradition in Zablocki and Stanley, it is curious
that Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez, which was issued between
Zablocki and Stanley, relies on tradition. Finding a fundamental right to
education, Marshall, dissenting, chided the Court for "retreat[ing] from
our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity," 288 and
based his fundamental rights analysis on, among other things, "the
unique status" traditionally accorded education by our society.289
This flirtation with history is particularly surprising in Marshall's
case, since he has explicitly distanced himself from tradition in his non-
judicial writing.29° It further highlights the unevenness of Marshall's
methodological approach to fundamental rights and shows the extent to
which Justices will employ tradition when they determine it best suits
their interests.29'
285. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
286. Id. at 564, 565.
287. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (citing, among others, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
288. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Marshall augmented his employment of tradition with other analytical tools to find
fundamental rights. See, e.g., id. at 102 (asserting that fundamental rights analysis should be
grounded in the text of the Constitution and "the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights
are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution"); id. at Ill (looking to precedent
and "the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values"
to assess the purported fundamental right to education).
289. Id. at I 1.
290. See generally Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1987).
291. While scrutinizing the opinions that the Justices joined is outside the scope of this article,
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H. Justice White
Justice White's employment of tradition in fundamental rights anal-
ysis is confusing at best. While he wrote significant fundamental rights
opinions that directly confronted the proper role of tradition when
assessing purported fundamental rights, his own uneasiness with
employing history exemplifies the Court's ambivalence toward such a
methodology.
Three of White's opinions span the spectrum of tradition's use in
fundamental rights analysis. First, White's methodology for assessing
the fundamental right at stake in Michael H. v. Gerald D. is difficult to
discern. While Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan sparred over the pro-
priety of the use of tradition in finding a purported fundamental right,
White avoided the fray, neither acknowledging the debate over tradition
nor providing insight into what he thought was the proper methodology
to assess the fundamentality of a purported right.2 92
White did join the debate over tradition in two other opinions. In
Moore, White relied solely on precedent and the Palko test: a purported
right is fundamental if "neither liberty nor justice would exist if (it) were
sacrificed."2 93 Interestingly, he explicitly rejected the methodology used
by Justice Powell, who, writing for the plurality, claimed that the Court
should assess whether the purported right is deeply rooted in tradition.294
White explained:
For me, this suggests .. .a far less meaningful and less confining
guiding principle than Mr. Justice Stewart would use for serious sub-
stantive due process review. What the deeply rooted traditions of the
country are is arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the
Due Process Clause is even more debatable.295
Amazingly, White wrote the majority opinion in Bowers, which
relied nearly exclusively on tradition to find there is no fundamental
Marshall's inconsistent employment of tradition is starker when one considers the opinions he
joined. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136, 137-42 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (joining Justice Brennan's dissent that explicitly rejects tradition as a tool to assess
fundamental rights), with Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237, 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(joining Justice Stevens's dissent that employs tradition to assess fundamental rights); and Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 301, 304-05 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joining
Justice Brennan's dissent that relies almost exclusively on tradition).
292. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 157-60 (White, J., dissenting). White relied on precedent
somewhat in Michael H., although he never was explicit with respect to his choice of fundamental
rights methodologies. See id.
293. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
294. See id.
295. Id. White also argued that invoking tradition would "broaden enormously the horizons of
the Clause," a befuddling claim for which he neither provided support nor explained in further
detail. Id. at 549-50.
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right to engage in homosexual sodomy.29 6 Even more fantastic is that
White cited Powell's plurality opinion in Moore to support his reliance
on tradition.297 The obvious explanation for this erratic application of
tradition is that tradition supported White's desired outcome in Bowers,
but did not support it in Moore. 98
I. Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan exhibited the strongest love-hate relationship with
tradition in the fundamental rights context. Brennan found a fundamen-
tal right in each of the seven major fundamental rights opinions he
authored, and he employed tradition when he thought it supported find-
ing a fundamental right. He ignored tradition, however, and even
explicitly rejected tradition, when he believed it did not justify the fun-
damental right he wished to recognize.299
Brennan's most celebrated discussion of the use of tradition in fun-
damental rights analysis appears in Michael H. Unlike most Justices
who have chosen not to apply tradition when assessing a fundamental
right, Brennan confronted tradition explicitly in Michael H., chiding the
majority for invoking it. Prior to delineating his qualms with using tra-
dition as a tool to assess fundamental rights, Brennan remarked,
"because the plurality's opinion's exclusively historical analysis
portends a significant and unfortunate departure from our prior cases and
from sound constitutional decisionmaking, I devote a substantial portion
of my discussion to it." 3" He then identified a number of problems with
invoking tradition as a means to assess fundamental rights: it is not
objective, it dictates results that contradict prior fundamental rights hold-
ings, it strips the Fourteenth Amendment of its potency, and it perpetu-
ates prior discrimination.3 10 In lieu of tradition, Brennan argued that the
"better approach" to finding fundamental rights is to assess whether the
296. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986).
297. See id. at 192.
298. Another commentator has arrived at the same conclusion:
One major factor distinguishes the Court's use of history in Moore from that in
Bowers. In the former case, history served to expand the universe of fundamental
rights rising under the due process clause, while the latter declines to use history in
such a way. The Court's historical analysis in Bowers leads to its refusal to expand
the field of fundamental rights. This maintenance of the substantive due process
status quo appears to be a paramount consideration for Justice White.
Steegmann, supra note 8, at 394.
299. See also Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal Romance, Community, and Tradition in
William J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1312-20 (1991)
(recognizing Brennan's inconsistent use of tradition in fundamental rights opinions).
300. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
301. See id. at 137-41. Brennan did not elaborate on some of these concepts, all of which are
discussed in detail infra Parts Ill-IV.
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purported right is "close enough to the interests that we already have
protected [in judicial opinions]. '' 3°2
In four opinions issued prior to Michael H., Brennan similarly
refused to invoke tradition in fundamental rights analysis, albeit some-
what less boldly. In Shapiro, Eisenstadt, and Carey, in which Brennan
authored the opinions of the Court, Brennan used precedent that was not
exclusively based on tradition to assess the purported fundamental right
at issue.30 3 Only in his Rodriguez dissent did Brennan stray from using
precedent, asking instead whether the right at issue was "linked" to other
constitutional rights, or whether it was important to "the effectuation of
those rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed. 3 °4
In light of these four opinions and, most obviously, Brennan's
attack on tradition in Michael H., it is inexplicable that he relied nearly
exclusively on tradition in two seminal cases: Moore and Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.3 °5 Assessing the purported
fundamental right in Moore, Brennan looked to the "rights that histori-
cally have been central, and today remain central, to a large proportion
of our population."306 Dissenting in Cruzan, Brennan relied extensively
on tradition to find a "fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial
nutrition and hydration."3 7  Impersonating Justice Scalia, Brennan
asked whether the purported right had been "firmly entrenched in Amer-
ican tort law" and "the earliest common law."30 8
What sets apart Brennan's uneven application of tradition from that
of his colleagues, save Justices White30 9 and Stevens,"' is that instead
of merely ignoring tradition when he determined that it did not support
his desired result, he explicitly rejected it, finding it unsuitable for fun-
damental rights analysis. Thus, while the result-oriented nature of Bren-
nan's reliance on tradition is unremarkable, it is the transparency of his
result-oriented application that is distinctive.
302. Id. at 142. He also argued that the plaintiffs interest must be weighed against the state's
interest in limiting the purported fundamental right. See id. at 145.
303. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-33 (1969).
304. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 62, 63 (1973).
305. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
306. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 510 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). In
another passage, Brennan viewed the purported right "in ... light of the tradition of the American
home that has been a feature of our society since our beginning as a Nation ...." Id. at 507. A
brief portion of Brennan's concurrence also assessed whether precedent supported the
fundamental right. See id. at 510-1I.
307. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302.
308. Id. at 305.
309. See supra Part V.H.
310. See infra Part VJ.
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J. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens's use of tradition to find fundamental rights mimics
White's and Brennan's invocation of tradition in one significant way: he
explicitly rejected tradition in one case, even though he used it exten-
sively elsewhere.
The Justices in Bowers, as in Michael H., squarely confronted tradi-
tion as an analytical tool. Responding to the Bowers majority, which
relied on tradition, Stevens's dissent stated that "the fact that the gov-
erning majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice."3 Instead, Stevens resorted to judicial precedent that was not
grounded in tradition to find a fundamental right to engage in
sodomy. 3 2
However, Stevens's fundamental rights analysis in no less than
three fundamental rights cases is incongruous with his explicit denuncia-
tion of tradition in Bowers. His concurrence in Washington v. Glucks-
berg, his most recent fundamental rights opinion, is illustrative. In
Glucksberg, Stevens concluded that "[h]istory and tradition provide
ample support for refusing to recognize an open-ended constitutional
right to commit suicide.""'3 Similarly, in Cruzan, while not exclusively
relying on tradition, Stevens was unequivocal in his opinion that tradi-
tion is an indispensable tool to assess purported fundamental rights.
Quoting Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Nathan Hale, and Patrick Henry,
among other aged sources,314 Stevens assessed whether the asserted fun-
damental right was "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental. '315
Lastly, in Moore, Stevens resorted to practices that existed "[long
before the original States adopted the Constitution" to determine
whether the purported right was fundamental.3t 6 Such an adherence to
tradition is, on the surface, irreconcilable with his unequivocal repudia-
tion of tradition in Bowers. One explanation, though, is that his rejec-
tion of tradition in Bowers is rooted in the fact that tradition could not
have supported the fundamental right he found in Bowers,3 17 whereas he
311. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986).
312. See id. at 216-18.
313. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 (1997).
314. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343-44 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
315. Id. at 343.
316. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Stevens also relied on precedent to find a fundamental right in Moore. See id. at 516-17.
317. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (admitting that "[s]odomy was
condemned as an odious and sinful type of behavior during the formative period of the common
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believed that tradition supported the fundamental right he found in
Moore.
Analyzing inconsistent applications of tradition by the same Jus-
tices in different opinions reveals that, as applied, employing tradition
has permitted the same result-oriented approach that has always plagued
fundamental rights doctrine.31 Most Justices invoke tradition to
"serv[e] as [a] post hoc rationalization for results reached on ahistorical
bases. 31 9 It is through this lens that jurists act like mathematicians
solving a proof-starting with the result and only later filling in the mid-
dle steps-selectively using or eliding tradition.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fundamental rights jurisprudence has always been controversial.
The notion of fundamental rights-particularly due process having a
substantive component-provoked John Hart Ely to contemplate the
meaning of "green pastel redness. ' 320 But, accepting that fundamental
rights should be a lasting aspect of American jurisprudence, we must ask
a more probing question-one that Professor Ely admitted is among the
"hardest questions" to answer:321 how do we find fundamental rights?
Reexamining how we recognize fundamental rights is particularly
important now, when the current dominant method for finding funda-
mental rights-adhering to tradition-often renders the doctrine a nul-
lity. To protect as a fundamental right only those activities that have
law"); Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986) (concluding that sodomy has traditionally been prohibited in
nearly all cultures). But see Norman C. Simon, The "Evolution" of Lesbian and Gay Rights:
Reconceptualizing Homosexuality and Bowers v. Hardwick from a Sociobiological Perspective,
1996 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 105, 136 (arguing that "the historical proscriptions against homosexual
conduct that the majority in Bowers cited are flawed").
318. Another way of approaching the inconsistent, result-oriented application of tradition in
fundamental rights jurisprudence would be to review the many instances where one jurist used
tradition in a specific opinion, and another jurist avoided employing tradition altogether in the
same case. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(relying upon judicial precedent to find the fundamental right, while Justice Powell, concurring,
finds no fundamental right based on tradition); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich.
1994) (holding that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide primarily by
resorting to tradition, while Justices Levin and Mallett, dissenting in part, find, without relying on
tradition, that there should be such a fundamental right); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y.
1980) (holding, without invoking tradition, that there is a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy, while Judge Gabrielli, dissenting in part, concluded that there should not be
such a fundamental right after relying nearly exclusively on tradition).
319. Steegmann, supra note 8, at 395 (adding that such an approach creates an "appearance of
disingenuousness").
320. Ely, supra note 12, at 18; see also, e.g., John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 502 (1997) (referring to the "textual conundrum of
substantive due process").
321. Ely, supra note 12, at 5.
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been traditionally respected undermines the usefulness of the fundamen-
tal rights doctrine. There is no need, for example, to recognize a funda-
mental right to breathe.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is not always so clear how to
assess a purported fundamental right in light of tradition. In a nation as
culturally diverse as the United States, jurists interpreting tradition are
forced to pick and choose among traditions, lest judicial opinions turn
into ethnic studies tomes. In other words, jurists must ask themselves,
"Whose tradition matters?" The question is seldom asked, and the
answer is not readily apparent.
Predictably, jurists most often focus on their own traditions-usu-
ally the history and historical perspective of straight, white, wealthy
males. This raises yet another problem: the history of straight, white,
wealthy males is often a history of the oppressor. As such, relying on
tradition frequently legitimizes and perpetuates prior discrimination, an
odious result in and of itself, but also one that is at odds with the letter
and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, this is, as we have also seen, not always the case.
Sometimes jurists move past their positionality, and they rely on a tradi-
tion outside of their personal experience. In addition, some jurists'
interpretations of tradition conflict with the fundamental rights holdings
they desire, and they either gloss over tradition analysis or refuse to
acknowledge tradition in their opinions altogether. Moreover, as has
been pointed out elsewhere, jurists' interpretations of history are often
wrong, insofar as a historical interpretation can be incorrect. Therefore,
employing tradition to assess a purported fundamental right does not
lend to the jurisprudence the certainty or objectivity it is supposed to
provide. It frequently does not constrain jurists in the manner that pro-
ponents of a tradition methodology claim it does. For all of these rea-
sons, borne out in the judicial opinions discussed above, tradition should
not be used to assess "new" fundamental rights.
Some tempered advocates for a tradition-based methodology have
attempted to side-step the aforementioned problems with using tradition
as an analytical tool. They argue that employing tradition is neither too
backward-looking nor discriminatory when jurists account for changing
traditions.322 Doing so, they contend, effectively "updates" or "modern-
izes" fundamental rights jurisprudence, rooting out the consideration of
322. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765-66 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(urging the Court to assess purported fundamental rights with respect to what "history teaches are
the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke" and
commenting that "tradition is a living thing") (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (same). This fundamental rights methodology is grounded in the "moral consensus"
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antiquated discriminatory practices from fundamental rights analysis.
To some degree, this approach seems plausible, as tradition, indeed, is
always changing.323
Note, though, that there are many deficiencies with the "living his-
tory" approach to finding fundamental rights. First, and most simply, it
does not account for the existence of contemporary discrimination. Just
as "separate but equal" was the dominant practice in 1896 and
onward, 324 there are surely aspects of twenty-first century "American
culture"-whatever that is-that will be considered discriminatory in
the future.
Second, it raises a further vexing question, namely how to decide
what is the current societal practice. In other words, when does a tradi-
tion end? Third, eradicating injustice from our nation's traditions is a
painfully slow process. Why should we patiently wait to root out
racism, classism, homophobia, misogyny, and xenophobia, among other
forms of discrimination, from our society before excising it from our
jurisprudence?
Fourth, relying on a "living history" does not, in fact, address most
of the problems with a tradition-based methodology that have been dis-
cussed in this article. An updated-tradition approach still injects dis-
crimination into fundamental rights jurisprudence, still permits
substantial subjectivity, still disrespects the countermajoritarian purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and still may render the fundamental
rights doctrine moot. Even this somewhat restrained tradition-based
analytical framework is both unmanageable and untenable.
Where does this leave us? After all, we obviously need guidelines
to determine whether a "right" should be deemed fundamental.325 If tra-
theory of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973).
323. See, e.g., Michael Albert, WTO/Seattle/Mumia, available at http://www.zmag.org/
CrisesCurEvts/Mumia/wtomumia.htm ("[W]hat history really shows is that today's empire is
tomorrow's ashes, that nothing lasts forever .... ) (quoting Mumia Abu-Jamal).
324. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a law mandating that Blacks
and whites use "separate but equal" facilities was constitutional).
325. Lindsey v. Nonnet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), is a good example of the pitfall of assessing the
fundamentality of an asserted right without employing any discernible fundamental rights
methodology. In Lindsey, the majority of the Court held that there was no fundamental right to
adequate housing, see id. at 73-74 (commenting that "the Constitution ... [does not provide] any
• . . guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality"), while Justice Douglas's dissent
opined that there should be such a fundamental right, see id. at 89-90 (stating that "the right is so
fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home . . . . To put him into the street when the slum
landlord, not the slum tenant, is the real culprit deprives the tenant of a fundamental right").
Regrettably, because neither the majority nor Douglas set forth analytical frameworks, Lindsey
provides little to no guidance with respect to how it may be used as precedent or how to assess a
purported fundamental right in the future.
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dition is an inappropriate methodology to assess purported fundamental
rights, how should we conduct our fundamental rights inquiry?
As mentioned in the Introduction, this article does not propose a
substitute methodology to assess the fundamentality of purported rights.
It would be premature to essay an alternative analytical framework prior
to the mounting of significant opposition to the role played by tradition
in recognizing "new" fundamental rights. Accordingly, this article
hopefully will spark resistance to the current tradition-bound approach.
When that time comes-when there is sufficient criticism of a tra-
dition-minded fundamental rights jurisprudence-and we begin to
search for a new model to assess purported fundamental rights, perhaps
we will keep in mind Casey, which did not engage in any examination of
tradition. Instead, a plurality of the Court in Casey, after commenting
that fundamental rights is "not susceptible of expression as a simple
rule" '326 and "has not been reduced to any formula, ' 327 asked to what
extent the right to an abortion was "central to personal dignity and
autonomy.
More opinions rejecting a tradition-bound methodology are possi-
ble, but only if jurists, scholars, and practitioners are willing to seriously
reexamine the use of tradition to assess purported fundamental rights.
Without such a critical reflection, the status quo-invoking tradition,
however sporadically-will continue to strip substance from fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence.
326. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
327. Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
328. Id. at 851.
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